

Hawks, Doves, and Regime Type in International Rivalry and Rapprochement

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March 21, 2025

Abstract

Existing scholarship emphasizes hawks' advantages in making peace but is squarely focused on democratic leaders, even though the vast majority of international rivalries feature at least one autocracy. I argue that regime type moderates the relationship between foreign policy orientation and peace: doves should be more successful peacemakers in autocracies than in democracies. In low-accountability autocracies where domestic audiences struggle to punish leaders, the *credibility* problem doves face in selling peace at home becomes less salient relative to doves' *motivation* to cooperate internationally. I demonstrate that the predicted patterns hold in a large-N set of post-World War II cases. I conclude by examining two key cases that demonstrate the theorized mechanisms: the end of the Cold War and the Egypt-Israel rapprochement. The theory explains why it could take a hawk like Nixon to go to Beijing, but a dove like Gorbachev to come to Washington.

Word Count: 13,197

Keywords: Leaders, rivalry, rapprochement, hawkishness, regime type

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Introduction

Amidst the United States' unexpected rapprochement with the Soviet Union in the 1980s, the Pulitzer Prize-winning *New York Times* columnist Russell Baker asked, "Why is it that to improve relations with Communists we have to have conservative Red-baiters in the White House?"¹ Coming to the White House with a reputation as a hardliner on national security, Ronald Reagan ended his presidency as a champion for arms control and East-West diplomacy. Scholars have provided compelling explanations for Baker's counterintuitive observation. Hawks have an advantage navigating the domestic politics of peacemaking because they can more credibly signal the wisdom of conciliation than doves² and because hawks who pursue cooperation come across as moderate to voters.³

The Reagan case remains puzzling, however. While Reagan played against type to make peace, his counterpart in the Soviet Union did not. Mikhail Gorbachev was a dove and acted like one to achieve a rapprochement with the West. How can we square the now-conventional wisdom of a hawks' advantage in peacemaking with Gorbachev's central role in ending the Cold War? The U.S.-Soviet case highlights an important gap in the literature. Existing theoretical and empirical work on hawkishness and rapprochement is squarely focused on democratic political systems, even though most notable international rivalries feature at least one autocracy.⁴ Does regime type moderate how leader hawkishness influences international rivalry and rapprochement? The key role of autocracies in historic and contemporary rivalries renders this question important

¹Russell Baker, "Rising above Self," *New York Times*, May 28, 1988, <https://www.nytimes.com/1988/05/28/opinion/observer-rising-above-self.html>.

²Alex Cukierman and Mariano Tommasi, "When Does it Take a Nixon to Go to China?", *American Economic Review*, Vol. 88, No. 1 (1988), pp. 180-197; Tyler Cowen and Daniel Sutter, "Why Only Nixon Could Go to China," *Public Choice*, Vol. 97, No. 4 (1998), pp. 605-615; Sarah E. Kreps, Elizabeth N. Saunders, and Kenneth A. Schultz, "The Ratification Premium: Hawks, Doves, and Arms Control," *World Politics*, Vol. 70, No. 4 (2018), pp. 479-514; Michaela Mattes and Jessica LP Weeks, "Hawks, Doves, and Peace: An Experimental Approach," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 99, No. 3 (2019), pp. 435-452.

³Kenneth A. Schultz, "The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves Deliver the Olive Branch?," *International Organization*, Vol. 59, No. 1 (2005), pp. 1-38; Mattes and Weeks, "Hawks, Doves, and Peace."

⁴Notably, while theoretical work on the topic assumes some form of democratic accountability, authors do sometimes imply that the logic should apply in autocratic context. See Cukierman and Tommasi, "When Does it Take a Nixon to Go to China."

as a matter of scholarship and policy.

In this paper, I explore how implementation concerns at the domestic level impact which types of leaders are likely to conclude a rapprochement with international rivals. Following Michaela Mattes and Jessica Weeks, I define rapprochement as the establishment of better working relations by erstwhile rivals.⁵ To successfully conclude a rapprochement, leaders must be both (1) willing to make peace internationally and (2) able to deliver it domestically.⁶ Hawks and doves differ in their value for diplomacy and, as a result, offer distinct and symmetric advantages and disadvantages in meeting these two conditions.⁷ Hawks have a *credibility* advantage with domestic audiences precisely because they are not seen as very motivated to pursue cooperation in the first place. Doves' *motivation* to achieve peace makes them more willing to pursue it internationally, but at the cost of their domestic credibility on matters of cooperation. In other words, there are credibility and motivation effects that push in opposite directions.

I argue that regime type conditions the relative importance of these two effects.⁸ Democratic accountability amplifies the salience of credibility, resulting in the hawks' advantage identified in existing work. However, in low-accountability autocratic regimes, the salience credibility falls. At the extreme, if domestic audiences are entirely unable to hold leaders accountable, a leader's ability to signal the wisdom of cooperation becomes immaterial to policy outcomes. Rather, what matters most for peace in low-accountability settings is a leader's motivation to achieve it. As a result, in autocratic political systems, we should expect doves and not hawks to deliver the olive branch.

The monadic effect of this *domestic accountability mechanism* in moderating the link between

⁵Michaela Mattes and Jessica LP Weeks, "From Foes to Friends: The Causes of Interstate Rapprochement and Conciliation," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 27 (2024), pp. 185-204.

⁶Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (1988), pp. 427-460.

⁷For discussion of the differences between hawks and doves, see, Donald Casler, David Ribar, and Keren Yarhi-Milo, "The Many Faces of Credibility: Hawks, Doves, and Nuclear Disarmament," *Security Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2023), pp. 413-445.

⁸Though I focus primarily on the distinction between autocracy and democracy, the argument is also compatible with finer-grained regime-type distinctions (e.g., personalism). I discuss this in more detail theoretically and empirically below and in the appendix.

foreign policy orientation and peace is reinforced by a dyadic *international engagement mechanism*. Regime type is also likely to condition whether foreign counterparts prefer to deal with a hawkish or dovish leader. Autocrats may prefer to deal with democratic hawks because they anticipate the importance of the latter's credibility at home. On the other hand, leaders likely prefer to deal with autocratic doves, both because they (1) anticipate that domestic credibility is less salient in autocracies and because (2) autocratic doves engage in diplomacy more enthusiastically, thereby increasing democratic audiences' approval of cooperative policies.⁹

I draw on these logics to generate empirically testable predictions. First, hawkishness should be more strongly correlated with rapprochement in democracies than autocracies. Second, leader pairings featuring democratic hawks and autocratic doves should be especially likely to achieve a rapprochement.

As a high-level statistical test of these predictions, I examine the most intense rivalries of the post-World War II era. Using pre-tenure correlates of hawkishness identified in prior work, I code the foreign policy orientation and regime type of each leader for each country over the duration of the rivalry in question, noting which leaders did or did not achieve a rapprochement. An examination of the resulting data lends support to the theory's predictions. Regime type moderates the relationship between leader foreign policy orientation and rapprochement, with hawkishness more strongly correlated with peace for democratic leaders than autocratic leaders. Moreover, leader pairings with democratic hawks and autocratic doves are especially predictive of rapprochement. Democratic hawk-autocratic dove pairs may be especially auspicious in the context of mixed-regime rivalries. To illustrate the theoretical mechanisms, I return to the case that motivated this study: the end of the Cold War. As a second look at the theoretical mechanisms, I examine the Egypt-Israel rapprochement.

This paper makes a number of contributions. First, it offers a general theory of leader foreign

⁹Michaela Mattes and Jessica LP Weeks, "Reacting to the Olive Branch," *International Organization*, Vol. 76, No. 4 (2022), pp. 957-976.

policy orientation and diplomatic rapprochement, expanding existing work to cover all political regimes. Implicitly or explicitly, existing work on the Nixon-to-China phenomenon has focused on democracies. However, given that democracies rarely find themselves in conflictual security relationships with other democracies,¹⁰ it is important to understand how foreign policy orientation intersects with regime type in international rivalry. I find that the hawks' credibility advantage relative to doves hinges on regime type. The paper thus responds to Susan Hyde and Elizabeth Saunders' call for researchers to recapture regime type in the study of international politics.¹¹

Second, and related, the paper provides the first large-N observational evidence that democratic hawks are more likely to deliver the olive branch than democratic doves. Existing work shows evidence of a hawks' advantage in case studies.¹² Experimental research also shows that hawks enjoy advantages in delivering peace domestically *conditional* on being willing to pursue rapprochement in the first place.¹³ However, if democratic hawks very rarely seek rapprochement, it could still be the case that democratic doves are overall more likely to achieve a rapprochement because they attempt diplomatic engagement more frequently. The results presented here build on existing work show that democratic hawks are, indeed, more likely to deliver the olive branch unconditional on the initial choice to pursue peace. Crucially, however, the relationship is reversed in autocracies, which play a central role in most rivalries.

Third, the paper offers the first attempt to understand how different types of leaders—hawks and doves—interact across the negotiating table. Existing work on leader hawkishness and peace brackets the counterpart with which hawkish or dovish leaders must negotiate. Similarly, other research on leader attributes tends to focus only on the biography or worldview of a single leader in a given analysis.¹⁴ By highlighting leader pairings as part of a strategic interaction, this project

¹⁰Though the causes of this relationship remain subject to debate, the relationship is very strong. For discussion, see Allan Dafoe, John R. Oneal, and Bruce Russett, "The Democratic Peace: Weighing the Evidence and Cautious Inference," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 57, No. 1 (2013)

¹¹Susan D. Hyde and Elizabeth N. Saunders, "Recapturing Regime Type in International Relations: Leaders, Institutions, and Agency Space," Vol. 74, No. 2 (2020), pp. 363-395.

¹²Kreps, Saunders, and Schultz, "The Ratification Premium"; Schultz, "The Politics of Risking Peace."

¹³Mattes and Weeks, "Hawks, Doves, and Peace."

¹⁴For a review of the leader biography literature, see Michael Horowitz and Matthew Fuhrmann, "Studying Leaders

advances the literature not only on hawkishness and peace but on leader attributes more broadly.

Finally, the theory offers a new take on diplomacy, leadership, and the end of the Cold War. As the opening of this article notes, existing work explains why a hawk like Reagan could help to facilitate a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. However, it is silent on a dovish Gorbachev's equal if not greater contribution to ending the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. The moderating role of regime type on the relationship between hawkish leaders and international cooperation presented in this article reconciles the apparent contradiction of this important historical case.

This paper will proceed as follows. First, I review the literature on hawks' advantages in peacemaking. Second, I build a theory of regime type, leader foreign policy orientation, and rapprochement. Third, I provide high-level statistical evidence that the theory has empirical purchase. Fourth, I use two case studies—of the US-USSR rapprochement and of the Egypt-Israel rapprochement—to examine the theory's proposed mechanisms. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the article's implications.

Foreign Policy Orientations and International Peace

Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1972 shook global politics not just because it broke a long-standing taboo on high-level engagement with "Red China," but because Nixon had risen to political prominence as one of the America's most strident anti-Communists.¹⁵ Nixon's hawkish reputation seemed to give him special credibility in navigating the domestic politics of rapprochement and in assuring skeptics that more robust ties to Beijing were in the national interest.¹⁶ The episode gave rise to the aphorism that it "takes a Nixon to go to China."

and Military Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 62, No. 10 (2018), pp. 2072-2086; Daniel Krcmaric, Stephen Nelson, and Andrew Roberts, "Studying Leaders and Elites," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 23 (2020), pp. 133-151.

¹⁵See Rick Perlstein, *Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008); James Mann, *The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War* (New York: Penguin, 2009).

¹⁶Chris Tudda, *A Cold War Turning Point* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2012).

In the decades since, scholars have developed theoretical logics to explain how leaders achieve controversial policy shifts such as rapprochement—the establishment of better working relations with an erstwhile rival¹⁷—by playing against type.¹⁸ One perspective argues that politicians who play against type can more credibly signal the wisdom of a policy choice.¹⁹ Here, credibility refers to a domestic audience’s trust in a leader’s claim that a policy is optimal given the state of the world. Leaders have better information about the state of the world than members of the domestic audience. Because doves have an ideological preference for cooperation, when a dovish politician pursues cooperation, voters are unsure whether this reflects objective domestic and international conditions or the politician’s biases. By contrast, when a hawk claims that cooperation is the best policy, it must be so; hawks have an ideological preference for competition and so wouldn’t propose cooperation unless it was optimal.

A second perspective emphasizes political moderation. Ken Schultz concludes that hawks also pursue cooperation because it makes them appear reasonable.²⁰ Pursuing peace helps politicians from hawkish parties establish moderate credentials and appeal to the electorate. Meanwhile, politicians from dovish parties who pursue cooperation may appear more extreme. These domestic political incentives explain not just why playing against type is effective in revealing the “state of the world,” but also why hawkish politicians have an incentive to do it. Sarah Kreps, Elizabeth Saunders, and Ken Schultz build on earlier work by explaining that doves can sometimes overcome their credibility deficit by paying a ‘ratification premium,’ or side payments to legislators.²¹

¹⁷Mattes and Weeks, “From Foes to Friends”

¹⁸Consistent with Mattes and Weeks, I distinguish between rapprochement and reconciliation. I exclusively focus on the former, i.e., cases where rivals establish relatively normal and working relations, but do not necessarily develop warm or close ties. Rapprochement is a first step, and may simply result in a ‘cold peace’ rather than deep cooperation.

¹⁹Cukierman and Tommasi, “When Does it Take a Nixon to Go to China?”; Cowen and Sutter, “Why only Nixon Could Go to China.”

²⁰Schultz, “The Politics of Risking Peace.”

²¹Kreps, Saunders, and Schultz, “The Ratification Premium.” For additional work on hawks, doves, and rapprochement, see James Kim, “Presidential Hawkishness, Domestic Popularity, and Diplomatic Normalization,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 54, No. 1 (2024), pp. 83-103. Kim argues that doves in the U.S. are less likely to pursue diplomatic normalization when up in the polls, since playing to type is politically harmful and could jeopardize their strong standing. Matthew Fehrs adds additional texture to the political pressures politicians face in considering rapprochement, and the conditions under which they can play against type with minimal repercussions. See Matthew

Several studies offer empirical support for the idea of a hawks advantage in rapprochement. Focusing on a hypothetical dispute between the U.S. and China, Mattes and Weeks find experimental evidence for both the credibility and moderation mechanism summarized above.²² Though exploring crisis bargaining rather than rapprochement, Robert Trager and Lynn Vavreck find that Republican presidents enjoy higher approval than Democratic presidents among swing voters following peaceful outcomes.²³ Kreps, Saunders, and Schultz also offer empirical support for a hawks' advantage in the context of U.S. arms control agreements.²⁴ Though Democratic politicians often reach arms control deals, they typically receive less support and are often forced to cut side deals with hawks in the Senate that bolster other hawkish foreign policies.²⁵

Although the balance of the literature emphasizes a hawks' advantage, doves are not necessarily feckless or unable to contribute to cooperation. Some research contends that, despite hawks' credibility, doves are ultimately more likely to achieve cooperation.²⁶ A dove in Country A can use the prospect of their replacement by a more hawkish government to extract negotiating concessions from Country B. Chiozza and Choi find mixed results with respect to the hawks' advantage.²⁷ In addition, Mattes and Weeks find that domestic audiences view *foreign* doves' cooperative gestures as more sincere than those of foreign hawks, increasing support for reciprocal cooperation when the foreign leader is dovish.²⁸

Fehrs, "Leopards Can Change Their Spots," *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2014), pp. 669-687.

²²Mattes and Weeks, "Hawks, Doves, and Peace."

²³Robert Trager and Lynn Vavreck, "The Political Costs of Crisis Bargaining," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 55, No. 3 (2011), pp. 526-545.

²⁴Kreps, Saunders, and Schultz, "The Ratification Premium."

²⁵Michael Colaresi finds that leaders perceived as "overcooperating" with rivals suffer domestic backlash, which is consistent with the idea of a hawks' advantage. However, his work does not distinguish leader type from actions in office and thus is limited in its ability to speak to against-type dynamics per se. See Michael Colaresi, "When Doves Cry," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 48, No. 3 (2004), pp. 555-570.

²⁶Joe Clare, "Hawks, Doves, and International Cooperation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 58, No. 7, pp. 1311-1337.

²⁷Giacomo Chiozza and Ajin Choi, "Guess Who Did What: Political Leaders and the Management of Territorial Disputes, 1950-1990," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (2003), pp. 251-278.

²⁸Michaela Mattes and Jessica LP Weeks, "Reacting to the Olive Branch."

Regime Type and The Hawk-Dove Tradeoff

Though compelling, the literature on foreign policy orientation and rapprochement with rivals is squarely focused on democratic leaders and political systems, even as most notable international rivalries feature at least one autocracy.²⁹ This was the case in the Cold War-era, and it is the case today as rivalries between Washington and Moscow and Washington and Beijing have reemerged. However, there are good reasons to think that regime type could condition the link between foreign policy orientation and rapprochement. Extensive literatures on the democratic peace³⁰ and on authoritarian foreign policy³¹ suggest that institutions of accountability influence how leaders navigate the politics of international security.

I posit that hawks and doves differ primarily in their foreign policy preferences.³² Doves value diplomacy more than hawks and thus pursue diplomacy under more conditions. For leaders to produce a rapprochement, they must be both (1) willing to make peace internationally and (2) able to deliver it domestically.³³ Hawks and doves have distinct but symmetric advantages and disadvantages in meeting these conditions. Hawks enjoy *credibility* with domestic audiences precisely because they are not seen as especially motivated to seek cooperation.³⁴ Hawks often have the ability to make peace but infrequently the willingness.

By contrast, doves are highly *motivated* to seek cooperation internationally, yet this comes at the cost of their domestic support. Doves' bias toward diplomacy leads them to pursue rap-

²⁹Colaresi examines results by regime type and observes variation, though the dependent variable is leader survival rather than rapprochement and the key independent variable is dovish actions rather than dovish leader types. Chiozza and Choi interact regime type and leader experience, but not leader hawkishness.

³⁰Dafoe, Oneal, and Russett, "The Democratic Peace"; Alexandre Debs and Hein Goemans, "Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 104, No. 3 (2010), pp. 430-445.

³¹Michaela Mattes and Mariana Rodriguez, "Autocracies and International Cooperation," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 58, No. 3 (2014), pp. 527-538; Jessica LP Weeks, "Strongmen and Straw Men," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 106, No. 2 (2012), pp. 326-347; Jeff Colgan and Jessica LP Weeks, "Revolution, Personalist Dictatorships, and International Conflict," *International Organization*, Vol. 69, No. 1 (2015), pp. 163-194.

³²Schultz, "The Politics of Risking Peace"; Kreps, Saunders, and Schultz, "The Ratification Premium"; Casler, Ribar, and Yarhi-Milo, "The Many Faces of Credibility."

³³The context is in this way similar to that described by Robert Putnam in his description of two-level games. See Putnam, "Domestic Politics and Diplomacy."

³⁴Both preferences and perceived preferences matter. I assume they are positively correlated.

prochement more frequently, but this undermines their credibility with domestic audiences. When a dove pursues rapprochement, domestic audiences are unsure whether this reflects the wisdom of the policy or simply the dove's ideological bias. Doves have ample willingness to pursue a rapprochement but, as a result, limited ability to sell cooperation domestically.

These credibility and motivation effects push in opposite directions with respect to the likelihood of rapprochement, and it is not clear *a priori* that one or the other should dominate. The question of whether hawks or doves are more likely to produce an end to rivalry therefore can be reframed as a tradeoff. Doves are intrinsically motivated to achieve cooperation internationally, but may struggle to sell cooperation to domestic audiences. Hawks, on the other hand, can more easily sell cooperation to domestic audiences, which aids in the implementation of international agreements. But hawks may not be very motivated to implement cooperative policies in the first place. When is doves' motivation more salient than hawks' credibility and vice versa?

I argue that regime type resolves this tradeoff. Political regimes vary in the level of accountability they place on leaders. Accountability impacts the relationship between leader foreign policy orientation and rapprochement through two mechanisms: a (1) domestic accountability mechanism and an (2) international engagement mechanism.

The *domestic accountability mechanism* refers to the degree to which a leader's credibility before a domestic audience is material to policy implementation. In high-accountability regimes, the ability to credibly signal the wisdom of rapprochement to a domestic audience is very salient. Accountable leaders would struggle to stay in office or implement their foreign policy otherwise.³⁵ As a result, hawks' credibility with domestic audiences gives them an important advantage in making peace relative to doves. For example, Charles de Gaulle's conservatism and national

³⁵This perspective assumes that domestic audiences in high-accountability regimes like democracies are attentive to foreign policy and willing to punish leaders for their choices. Existing research find that democratic publics are attentive to partisan types in policy domains relevant to international rivalry. See, Joshua D. Kertzer, Deborah Jordan Brooks, and Stephen G. Brooks, "Do Partisan Types Stop at the Water's Edge?" *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 83, no. 4 (2021): 1764-1782. Other work finds that leader type influence domestic audience approval of rapprochement. See Mattes and Weeks, "Hawks, Doves, and Peace" and Mattes and Weeks, "Reacting to the Olive Branch."

security credentials put him on solid ground to withdraw from Algeria and to pursue an opening with China in the 1960s.³⁶ Likewise, though India and Pakistan have yet to achieve a rapprochement, they have perhaps come closest under relatively hawkish leaders, such as when the BJP's Atal Bihari Vajpayee made a highly publicized visit to Lahore in 1998 to meet with the right-leaning Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

The dynamic shifts, however, in low-accountability regimes. In such cases, the ability to signal the wisdom of rapprochement to a domestic audience is less salient. At the extreme, if domestic audiences are completely unable to hold leaders accountable, it renders their approval or disapproval of a given policy choice immaterial. With limited accountability, hawks' credibility advantage with domestic audiences loses importance to the diplomatic process. By the same token, doves' motivation to achieve cooperative outcomes with international rivals becomes more salient relative to the challenges they may face in convincing domestic audiences that the moment is ripe for rapprochement. Thus, the tradeoff between doves' willingness to make peace and hawks' ability to sell it domestically is weighted more heavily toward doves in low-accountability regimes. As a result, doves in low-accountability regimes may find more success in achieving a rapprochement than doves in high-accountability regimes. As the U.S.-Soviet case below shows, Gorbachev was able to sideline hawkish officials who might have stood in the way of a rapprochement with the U.S.

In addition to the monadic variation generated through the domestic accountability mechanism, there is also a dyadic *international engagement mechanism*, which refers to the effect of a leader's type and level of accountability on their attractiveness as a diplomatic partner. Democratic leaders face elections and legislatures may be in a position to block the implementation of leaders' foreign policies. As a result, foreign counterparts to democratic leaders may anticipate the importance of the democratic leader's credibility before their domestic audience. Understanding that a democratic dove may struggle to earn support for an agreement at home, foreign counterparts may

³⁶Julian Jackson, *De Gualle* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018); James Humes, *Nixon's Ten Commandments of Leadership and Negotiation* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998).

ultimately prefer to deal with democratic hawks. For this reason, Mao told Nixon that he “preferred rightists. . . Those on the right can do what those on the left talk about.”³⁷ Likewise, Egypt’s Anwar Sadat saw opportunity in partnering with his hawkish democratic counterpart, Menachem Begin, to achieve a rapprochement with Israel.³⁸ Given the salience of credibility in high-accountability political systems, there is value to dealing with hawks who can reliably persuade their domestic audiences to support a rapprochement since it reduces the odds that diplomatic effort will be for naught.

On the other hand, a foreign counterpart to an autocratic leader may appreciate that dictators often face more limited accountability, reducing the former’s concern about the latter’s ability to implement a deal. Understanding that a relatively less accountable dictator can more easily implement their preferred policies regardless of type, foreign counterparts prefer to deal with autocratic doves rather than autocratic hawks. This is because autocratic doves are more likely to reciprocate gestures toward rapprochement and contribute to positive-sum diplomatic outcomes. In turn, this may ease the political hurdles that their counterparts—especially democratic counterparts—face at home, a proposition supported by recent survey experimental research.³⁹ This helps to explain why Israel was able to make peace with the dovish King Hussein of Jordan in the 1990s, but not with the hawkish Hafez al-Asad of Syria.⁴⁰ Overall, then, through both a monadic domestic accountability mechanism and a dyadic international engagement mechanism, regime type is likely to condition whether hawks or doves are most likely to achieve a rapprochement with rivals.

Conceptualizing Accountability and Regime Type. The above suggests that the level of accountability in a given regime weights the tradeoff between hawks and doves as international peacemakers. As a first cut, I focus on the two “fundamental” regime types: democracy and autocracy.⁴¹ In democratic regimes, leaders are replaced via regular elections. In autocratic regimes, they

³⁷Tudda, *A Cold War Turning Point*, p. 182

³⁸Shahin Berenji, “Sadat and the Road to Jerusalem,” *International Security*, Vol. 45, No. 1 (2020), pp. 127-163.

³⁹Mattes and Weeks, “Reacting to the Olive Branch.”

⁴⁰Itamar Rabinovich, *The Brink of Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).

⁴¹(?, 79).

are replaced via costlier means, such as coups or revolutions. As a result, scholars have typically concluded that democratic leaders are more accountable, on average, than autocratic leaders.⁴²

In democracies, the pivotal voter has every incentive to remove from office a leader whose policies they dislike; they pay virtually no cost to do so. If a challenger is judged to offer greater benefits than the incumbent, there is no disincentive to replacing the incumbent. Similarly, opposition politicians have every incentive to block policies with which they disagree. By contrast, in autocracies, regime elites (or protesters) must assume great personal risk to oust a leader from office.⁴³ Coup plotters, for example, can expect imprisonment, exile, or death if a putsch fails. The high risks that regime elites potentially face for dissent creates a strong disincentive to removing leaders, which undermines accountability.

In addition, dictators generally have greater latitude than democrats to shape the composition of potentially constraining political bodies. For example, in a single-party dictatorship, a politburo might constitute the primary check on a leader. Yet dictators often remove political opponents from politburos and other bodies ostensibly aimed at providing accountability. In democracies, leaders typically have a more limited ability to shape institutions of accountability. For example, the bodies in the U.S. most responsible for constraining the president are Congress and the electorate. Presidents simply cannot fire—much less kill, imprison, or exile—opposition senators or swing-state voters.⁴⁴

Beyond the autocracy-democracy distinction, influential and persuasive research in IR has used finer-grained regime classifications to link domestic political institutions to international outcomes. For example, personalist leaders may be less constrained, and therefore more conflict

⁴²For example, see Bruce Russett and John Oneal, *Triangulating Peace* (New York: WW Norton, 2001); James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 3 (1994), pp. 577-592; Lisa Martin, *Democratic Commitments* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). For review and debate, see Hyde and Saunders, "Recapturing Regime Type in International Relations."

⁴³Milan Svolik, "Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 53, No. 2 (2009), pp. 477-494; Debs and Goemans, "Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War."

⁴⁴To be clear, a dictator's ability to remove potentially constraining actors from the political process is not absolute and may be greater in some types of autocracies than others.

prone, than non-personalist leaders.⁴⁵ However, existing research focuses on military crises; war; or more limited, everyday instances of cooperation. Since this paper represents the first attempt to relate regime type to rapprochement, I focus first on the broader distinction between democracy and autocracy. That said, the logic overall theoretical approach is broadly consistent with seminal work interrogating finer-grained regime type distinctions.⁴⁶ In the empirical section below and in the appendix, I revisit these more nuanced perspectives on regime type.

Rivalry and Rapprochement in the Post-WWII Era

Drawing on the theoretical arguments outlined above, I test the following empirical predictions:

1. *Hawkishness more strongly predicts rapprochement in democracies than autocracies.*
2. *The presence of democratic hawks in a rivalry should increase the probability of a rapprochement while the presence of autocratic hawks in a rivalry should decrease the probability of rapprochement.*
3. *In mixed-regime rivalries, democratic hawk-autocratic dove pairs are the most likely leader-pairing to achieve a rapprochement.*

To test these predictions, I use a nested multi-method research design to examine rival dyads in the post-World War II era.⁴⁷ First, I examine whether, broadly, the predicted patterns hold within this case universe. Second, I examine whether the theorized mechanisms can help to explain two prominent cases: the end of the Cold War and the Egypt-Israel rapprochement.

⁴⁵Weeks, "Strongmen and Straw Men"; Mattes and Rodriguez, "Autocracies and International Cooperation"; Colgan and Weeks, "Revolution, Personalist Dictatorship, and International Conflict."

⁴⁶For example, Weeks predicts conflict with two dimensions of variation: accountability and preferences, proxied by personalism and military/civilian regime composition. I also focus on accountability and preferences, using instead democracy and hawkishness as proxies. See Weeks, "Strongmen and Straw Men."

⁴⁷Evan S. Lieberman, "Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 99, No. 3 (2005), pp. 435-452.

Patterns of Rapprochement in the Post-World War II Era

I define my case universe by drawing on the Peace Data set.⁴⁸ The Peace Data assigns a “peace score” to each dyad in the international system. Peace scores take on five values, ranging from 0 (‘severe rivalry’) to 1 (‘security community’) in 0.25-point increments. Severe rivalry is characterized by the presence of war plans, frequent militarized interstate disputes, limited or no diplomatic contact, and major unresolved issues.

I examine all severe rivalries in the post-World War II period, defined as dyads that experienced a state of severe rivalry for at least one year.⁴⁹ I focus on severe rivalries because these are the cases where diplomacy is most likely to be controversial domestically, a necessary condition for against-type signaling to be politically meaningful.

This produces a set of 130 unique rivalries. Included are the most notable rivalries in world politics over the past 70+ years, including the U.S. and Soviet Union, the U.S. and China, Pakistan and India, Israel and various Arab neighbors, North and South Korea, China and Taiwan, and Somalia and Ethiopia, among others. Overall, the set of rivalries includes a diverse set of states, including major, middle, and small powers, as well as states in every region of the world.

I use this information to build two datasets. The first is a leader-rivalry level dataset, where there is an observation for each leader per rivalry involving the leader’s country while the leader is in office. I code whether or not a rivalry ended via rapprochement while a leader was in office, the leader’s hawkishness, and the regime type of the state they led. The second dataset focuses on leader pairs, where there is an observation for each pair of leaders in rival states whose tenures intersected. In this leader-pair dataset, I code the types of leaders involved in a rivalry, as well as ideal-type pairings (e.g., democratic hawk-autocratic dove, democratic dove-autocratic dove, etc.). Table 1 and Appendix Table A.2 provide descriptive statistics.

⁴⁸Paul Diehl, Gary Goertz, and Yahve Gallegos, “Peace Data,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 38, No. 5 (2021), pp. 605-624.

⁴⁹Specifically, the analysis will include leaders in office from 1946 to 2004, when the LEAD Dataset ends.

The Unconditional Probability of Rapprochement. In the quantitative analysis, I draw a distinction between the unconditional and conditional probabilities of rapprochement. The unconditional probability of rapprochement refers to the probability that a leader of a given type (i.e., hawk or dove) and level of accountability achieves a rapprochement, regardless of whether a rapprochement was attempted or not. By contrast, the conditional probability of rapprochement refers to the probability that a leader of a given type (i.e., hawk or dove) and level of accountability achieves a rapprochement, given that the leader sought a rapprochement in the first place. I focus exclusively on the *unconditional probability of rapprochement*. This is for two reasons. One, unconditional probabilities speak to whether rapprochement is overall more likely when doves or hawks are in power. Even if hawks have a credibility advantage, whether rapprochement is ultimately more likely under hawkish or dovish leadership depends on the frequency with which hawks and doves attempt rapprochement.⁵⁰ Focusing on unconditional probabilities accounts for this. Two, focusing on the unconditional likelihood of rapprochement under different leader types is more empirically tractable since it does not require determining whether leaders made an attempt at rapprochement. The only requirement is to know whether a rapprochement occurred or not.

Coding Rapprochement. I code that a rapprochement has occurred when there is an improvement from ‘severe rivalry’ to a more positive peace score, provided that improved relations resulted from diplomacy. This last condition is included because, according to the Peace Data, some dyads experience an improvement in relations for non-diplomatic reasons, such as the defeat in war of a state by its rival or rival-supported regime change (e.g., the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003). I use qualitative accounts of each rivalry provided by Diehl and colleagues to determine whether an improvement in the dyad score reflects diplomacy.

In the Peace Data, severe rivalries typically end over the course of one year (e.g., the U.S. and China were in a severe rivalry in 1971 and not in 1972 following Nixon’s trip to Beijing, when the peace score improved from 0 to 0.25). In some cases, however, improvements are coded by Diehl

⁵⁰To quote the hockey great Wayne Gretzky, “you miss 100% of the shots you don’t take.”

and colleagues as having occurred over multiple years, during what they call periods of transition. In the main manuscript, I credit the rapprochement to the leader who was in office in the year when the peace score increased. In the appendix, I present results where I credit the rapprochement to all leaders who were in office during the transition away from severe rivalry. The results are similar.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

N Rivalries	130
N Unique Countries	100
N Unique Leaders	583
Percent Hawks in Democracies	54.6%
Percent Hawks in Autocracies	49.6%
Percent Rivalries Achieving Rapprochement	66.1%
Mean Tenure at Rapprochement (yrs.)	8.0
Median Tenure at Rapprochement (yrs.)	5.0
Percent Returning to Rivalry after Rapprochement	1.5%

Coding Hawkishness. To code leader hawkishness, I use leader attributes that prior research finds prognostic of leaders' tendency toward conflict and cooperation. Though coarse, this approach has an important methodological advantage: it produces a measure of hawkishness that is independent of leader actions in office. Though it would be tempting to base hawkishness codings on leaders' actual record in office, the use of pre-tenure leader attributes ensures that the independent variable is temporally prior the dependent variable. This is crucial for studying against-type dynamics; we would not want a coding procedure that concludes Nixon was a dove because he made peace with China when the standard telling emphasizes the opposite.

Following the literature on hawks and rapprochement, I use party ideology to proxy hawkishness, with leaders of right-of-center parties classified as hawks.⁵¹ I use the Manifesto Project Dataset to identify right-of-center parties. I define right-of-center parties as those classified by the Manifestos Project as "conservative," "Christian democratic," or "nationalist or radical right."

⁵¹For example, see Clare, "Hawks, Doves, and International Rapprochement," or Kreps, Saunders, and Schultz, "The Ratification Premium." In some sense, using party ideology is essential for a fair test of existing work, since the idea of right/hawkish and left/dovish parties is also central to the theoretical side of the literature. See Cukierman and Tommasi, "When Does it Take a Nixon to Go to China?" and Schultz, "The Politics of Risking Peace."

Leaders from left-of-center parties are classified as doves (i.e., those labeled as “liberal parties,” “social democratic parties,” or “socialist or other left parties.”). Consistent with this approach, research finds that leaders from right-wing governments are more likely to pursue conflictual policies.⁵² Moreover, Appendix A.5 confirms that these right-of-center parties have more hawkish platforms than left-of-center parties.

Classifying autocratic leaders is more challenging, since party affiliation does not offer a shortcut. To address this limitation, I develop a coding scheme based on leaders’ personal backgrounds. Scholarship on leader biography has identified pre-tenure, biographical correlates of hawkish policy outcomes, particularly the use of military force, provocation of crises, and arming.⁵³ A key finding in this literature is that military experience predicts the use of force, *especially* among autocratic leaders.⁵⁴ In addition to being empirically predictive, it is theoretically rooted. In their seminal study, Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis argue that military service is the biographical attribute most plausibly connected to preferences for cooperation and conflict.⁵⁵ To that end, I code autocratic leaders as hawks if they have military experience according to the LEAD dataset.⁵⁶ Roughly 50% of the autocratic leaders in the dataset meet this definition of hawkishness, suggesting ample variation. Table 2 provides example leader codings.

For robustness, I consider a number of additional measures for hawkishness. I also produce a more expansive classification, which codes autocratic hawks as leaders who have military or rebel experience according to LEAD or who entered office irregularly according to Archigos.⁵⁷ Fuhrmann

⁵²Jeff Carter and Giacomo Chiozza, “State Leaders and Foreign Policy,” in *The Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics* (Oxford University Press, 2017).

⁵³Krcmaric, Nelson, and Roberts, “Studying Leaders and Elites”; Horowitz and Fuhrmann, “Studying Leaders and Military Conflict.”

⁵⁴Michael Horowitz, Allan Stam, and Cali Ellis, *Why Leaders Fight* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 137. The choice to use different background characteristics for autocratic and democratic leaders reflects two considerations. One, I can measure hawkishness for democratic leaders in a manner consistent with existing work. Second, ostensibly similar experiences and affiliations are unlikely to mean the same thing for an autocratic versus a democratic leader. For example, the socializing experience of military service is likely different for a conscript in a democratic country compared with an officer in an autocracy where the military plays a large role in politics.

⁵⁵Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis, *Why Leaders Fight*, p. 130.

⁵⁶Cali Mortenson Ellis, Michael Horowitz, and Allan Stam, “Introducing the LEAD Dataset,” *International Interactions*, Vol. 41, No. 4 (2015), pp. 718-741.

⁵⁷Hein Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza, “Introducing Archigos,” *Journal of Peace*

and Horowitz find that rebel experience predicts arming.⁵⁸ Goldfien, Joseph, and McManus suggest that leaders who come to power in coups are more risk-tolerant than other leaders, and thus may be more willing to use force.⁵⁹ Under this coding procedure, roughly 72% of autocrats are coded as hawks. The appendix presents models using this more expansive protocol for coding hawkishness. The appendix also presents results where military experience is used as a proxy for all leader types, as well as results using a willingness-to-use-force measure produced by Carter and Smith.⁶⁰

In addition to predicting hawkish behavior, these attributes correlate with perceptions of hawkishness. On the democratic side, recent survey evidence from the U.S., at least, suggests that citizens do perceive differences in hawkishness by party; Republicans are seen as more hardline on issues central to rivalries, such as defense spending and arms control.⁶¹ Similarly, in Israel, left-right divisions similarly map to perceived hawkishness, where many simply assume “Likud is hawk, Labor is dove.”⁶² On the autocratic side, present survey evidence that leaders with military experience and who come to power irregularly are seen as more willing to use military force.⁶³

Coding Regime Type. The theory focuses on the distinction between the “fundamental” regime types, autocracy and democracy. To capture this core distinction, I use the Democracy and Dictatorship (DD) dataset’s binary “democracy” coding.⁶⁴ In addition, this binary distinction allows for empirical tests that compare ideal types (e.g., democratic hawk, autocratic dove, etc.). That said, the basic theoretical logic should be flexible to accommodate a more nuanced understanding of political regimes. As such, Appendix B.1 presents empirical tests using a continuous measure of

Research, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 269-283.

⁵⁸Matthew Fuhrmann and Michael Horowitz, “When Leaders Matter,” *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 77, No. 1 (2015), pp. 72-87.

⁵⁹Michael Goldfien, Michael Joseph, and Roseanne McManus, “The Domestic Sources of International Reputation,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 117, No. 2 (2023), pp. 609-628.

⁶⁰Jeff Carter and Charles Smith, “A Framework for Measuring Leaders’ Willingness to Use Force,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 114, No. 4 (2020), pp. 1352-1358.

⁶¹Kerzter, Brooks, and Brooks, “Do Partisan Types Stop at the Water’s Edge?”

⁶²Baris Kesgin, “Features of Foreign Policy Birds: Israeli Prime Ministers as Hawks and Doves,” *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 55, No. 1 (2020), p. 114.

⁶³Goldfien, Joseph, and McManus, “The Domestic Sources of International Reputation.”

⁶⁴Jose Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Vreeland, “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited,” *Public Choice*, Vol. 143, No. 1 (2010), pp. 67-101.

regime type: the V-Dem project’s electoral democracy score. For models using the leader-rivalry dataset, I use regime type scores for the year the leader entered office. For models using the leader-pair dataset, I use regime type scores for the first year that a leader pair overlaps in office. The results are similar.

As noted, influential scholarship on authoritarianism and conflict has focused on personalism rather than the democracy/autocracy distinction.⁶⁵ In Appendix B.1, I present results using a measure of personalism.⁶⁶ The results are similar.

Table 2: Example Leader Codings

	Democratic	Autocratic
Dove	Jimmy Carter (USA) Kim Dae-jung (ROK) Shimon Peres (ISR) Willy Brandt (FRG) Harold Wilson (UKG) Bulent Ecevit (TUR)	Hussein bin Talal (JOR) Quet Masire (BOT) Haile Selassie (ETH) Antonio Salazar (POR) Jiang Zemin (CHN) Muhammad VI (MOR)
Hawk	Winston Churchill (UK) Charles De Gaulle (FRA) Menachem Begin (ISR) Recep Tayyip Erdogan (TUR) Ronald Reagan (USA) Konrad Adenauer (FRG)	Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (PAK) Chiang Kai-shek (ROC) Hafez al-Assad (SYR) Kim Il-Sung (PRK) Gamal Abdel Nasser (EGY) Idi Amin (UGA)

Control Variables and Threats to Inference. A potential threat to inference relates to the selection of leaders. Domestic audiences might, for example, select hawks to make peace. If so, the relationship between hawks and rapprochement reflects not credibility but simply a responsiveness to the domestic audience’s preferred policy. A feature of the research question and design offers a broad defense against these sorts of selection concerns: the theory predicts and the statistical analysis tests a differential relationship between hawkishness and peace conditional on regime type.

⁶⁵For example, Weeks, “Strongmen and Straw Men”; Mattes and Rodriguez, “Autocracies and International Cooperation”; Colgan and Weeks, “Revolution, Personalist Dictatorships, and International Conflict.”

⁶⁶Specifically, V-Dem’s `v2xnp_pres` variable, which captures the extent to which power is concentrated in the hands of a single individual leader.

If domestic audiences are predisposed to select certain types of leaders when they have an appetite for rapprochement, this would not be a threat to inference since the selection bias would push in the same direction across regime types. The interaction between hawkishness and democracy in Table 3 below, for example, would still capture the moderating role of regime type. In order to incorrectly reject the null, it would have to be that democratic electorates select hawks to make peace while autocratic domestic audiences select doves to make peace. This seems unlikely. Democratic hawks are thought to benefit electorally from the perception that rivals are unlikely to reciprocate cooperation,⁶⁷ suggesting that if anything they would be selected to compete with rivals rather than make peace with them. In addition, the lack of regular transfers of power in most autocracies adds an element of haphazardness to the process of leader selection. Finally, as Table 1 shows, leaders are typically in office for several years before achieving a rapprochement (mean = 8, median = 5). The temporal distance between leader selection and rapprochement cuts against the idea that leaders are simply selected at moments when rapprochement is likely.

That said, I include control variables in some model specifications to account for factors that might affect both the selection of leaders and the probability of rapprochement. A first factor is ongoing militarized disputes, which might impact both leader selection and the ‘ripeness’ of a rivalry for rapprochement. For the leader-rivalry dataset, the ‘MID Ongoing’ variable takes a value of 1 if there is a militarized interstate dispute (MID) ongoing in the year a leader comes to office, and 0 otherwise.⁶⁸ For the leader-pair dataset, the ‘MID Ongoing’ variable takes a value of 1 if there is a MID ongoing in the first year the pair of leaders intersect in office. A second factor that could impact both leader selection and the probability of rapprochement is the emergence of a shared rival, i.e., a case where there emerges a third-party rival to both states in rival dyad. For the leader-rivalry dataset, the variable ‘Emergence of Shared Rival’ takes a value of 1 if a shared rival has emerged in the three years prior to a leader taking office. For the leader-pair dataset, the variable ‘Emergence of Shared Rival’ takes a value of 1 if a shared rival has emerged in the three

⁶⁷Colaresi, “When Doves Cry.”

⁶⁸I used the Gibler, Miller, and Little MID data.

years prior to the first year in which a pair of rival leaders intersect in office. For example, suppose that X and Y are rivals and Y and Z are rivals. If X and Z become rivals, then a shared rival has emerged in the rivalry between X and Y and Y and Z. In addition, I also control for factors prior research suggests may influence the end of rivalry in general. One includes the “political shock” of the end of the Cold War, coded as observations that start after 1991.⁶⁹ The other is relative military capabilities.⁷⁰ I operationalize this with a variable called ‘CINC Ratio,’ which is the composite indicator or national capabilities (CINC) score of the first member of the rivalry divided by that of the second member of the rivalry, and where scores close to 1 indicate relative parity.

Results

I present the main statistical results below. First, I examine patterns using the leader-rivalry data to test Prediction 1. Next, I examine leader-pair data to test Predictions 2 and 3. Additional results using alternate measures and regression specifications can be found in the appendix.

Leader-Rivalry Level Results. Table 3 presents OLS estimates of the interaction between leader hawkishness and regime type. Models include robust standard errors clustered at the leader level. The argument presented above suggests that hawkishness and rapprochement should be more strongly correlated for democratic leaders, since democratic accountability increases the salience of the credibility hawks’ enjoy among domestic audiences. Therefore, we should expect to observe a positive interaction between hawkishness and democracy; the association between hawkishness and rapprochement is stronger in the presence of democracy.

threeparttable

The results provide strong support for Prediction 1, i.e., that hawkishness more strongly

⁶⁹Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl, “The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries,” *The American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 39, No. 1 (1995), pp. 30-52.

⁷⁰Andrew P. Owsiak and Toby J. Rider, “Clearing the Hurdle: Border Settlement and Rivalry Termination,” *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 75, No. 3 (2013), pp. 757-772.

Table 3: Interaction of Leader Hawkishness and Regime Type

	(1)	(2)
Hawk	−0.10** (0.04)	−0.13*** (0.05)
Democracy	−0.17*** (0.03)	−0.21*** (0.04)
Hawk × Democracy	0.17*** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.06)
MID Last 5		0.02 (0.03)
Shared Rival Emergence		−0.06 (0.05)
CINC Ratio		−0.00 (0.00)
Post Cold War		0.04 (0.04)
Intercept	0.23*** (0.03)	0.25*** (0.04)
Num. obs.	1036	855
N Clusters	442	360

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ Note: OLS w/ robust SEs clustered at the leader level.

predicts rapprochement in democracies than autocracies. In both models, the interaction between hawkishness and democracy is positive and statistically distinguishable from zero. The association between hawkishness and rapprochement is roughly 17 percentage points higher among democratic leaders than autocratic leaders.


As noted above, the appendix presents additional model specifications using alternate measures. This includes models using a continuous measure of democracy from V-Dem (Appendix B.1); using a measure of personalism rather than democracy (Appendix B.1); using a broader approach to coding hawkishness that includes rebel experience and irregular entry to office (Appendix B.2); using military experience as a proxy for hawkishness among all leaders (Appendix B.2); using Carter and Smith’s willingness-to-use-force measure (Appendix B.2); and using a more expansive approach to coding rapprochement, such that leaders in office during transition

periods away from rivalry are also credited (Appendix B.3). In addition, the appendix also examines the relationship between democratic leaders and rapprochement using Manifestos Project content analysis for the hawkishness/dovishness of party platforms (Appendix B.2). The appendix also presents results with the data transformed to the leader-rivalry-year level to account for different tenure lengths among leaders (Appendix B.5). These alternate modeling choices produce similar results; doves are far less disadvantaged as peacemakers in autocracies than democracies.

Leader-Pair Level Results. As an initial look, Figure 1 presents the coefficients from OLS models regressing rapprochement on indicator variables for the presence of democratic and autocratic hawks in a leader pairing. The democratic hawk variable takes a value of 1 when there is a democratic hawk in the leader-pairing and a value of 0 otherwise. The autocratic hawk variable takes a value of 1 when there is an autocratic hawk in the leader-pairing and a value of 0 otherwise. The models are estimated using robust standard errors clustered at the dyad level. The left panel shows results across all rivalry types, whereas the right panel shows results for mixed-regime rivalries only.

The results provide strong support for Prediction 2, i.e., that the presence of democratic hawks in a pairing should increase the probability of a rapprochement while the presence of autocratic hawks should decrease the probability of rapprochement. Across all rivalry types (left panel), the presence of a democratic hawk is associated with 8 percentage point increase in the probability of rapprochement, while the presence of an autocratic hawk is associated with a 6-7 percentage point decrease in the probability of rapprochement. Though highlighting of the value of democratic hawks and autocratic doves across all rivalry types, the interpretation of these results is complicated by the fact that, for example, autocratic-autocratic rivalries could have one or two hawks in a pairing. For a cleaner test, I restrict attention for mixed-regime rivalries (right panel), where there can be a maximum of one democratic hawk and a maximum of one autocratic hawk. In this common and important subset of cases, the results are also strongly supportive of Prediction 2. The presence of a democratic hawk is associated with a 7 percentage point increase in the probability

Figure 1: Leader Type and Rapprochement in Autocracies and Democracies



Note: Coefficients estimated using OLS with robust standard errors clustered at the rivalry level. Supporting tables are in the appendix.


of rapprochement while the presence of an autocratic hawk is associated with 7 percentage point decrease in the probability of rapprochement.

The appendix presents these results in tabular form (Appendix A.2), as well as estimates from similar models that use alternative approaches to coding hawkishness (Appendix B.2) and rapprochement (Appendix B.3). The results are similar.

I next zoom in on specific leader pairings. Focusing on mixed-regime rivalries, each leader-pair can be characterized as one of the following types: (1) democratic dove-autocratic hawk, (2) democratic dove-autocratic dove, (3) democratic hawk-autocratic hawk, or (4) democratic hawk-autocratic dove. Figure 2 presents the rate of rapprochement for each of these four ideal-type pairings. The p-values come from an OLS model that regresses rapprochement on a categorical variable of the leader-pairings listed above, with the democratic hawk-autocratic dove pairing serving as the omitted base category. The model is estimated with robust standard errors clustered

at the dyad level and without controls.

Figure 2: Leader Pairings and Rapprochement in Mixed-Regime Rivalries



Note: Group means, confidence intervals, and p-values for leader pairings estimated using OLS with robust standard errors clustered at the dyad level. Supporting tables can be found in the appendix.

The results provide support for Prediction 3, that democratic hawk-autocratic dove pairs should be most likely to achieve a rapprochement. Figure 2 indicates that democratic hawk-autocratic dove pairs were roughly 10 percentage points more likely to achieve a rapprochement than democratic hawk-autocratic hawk and democratic dove-autocratic dove pairs. Democratic hawk-autocratic dove pairs were roughly 14 percentage points more likely to achieve a rapprochement than democratic dove-autocratic hawk pairs. The differences between democratic hawk-autocratic dove pairs and other pairings were statistically significant at conventional levels. The appendix presents these results in tabular form (Appendix A.2), as well as results from additional model specifications that use alternative approaches to coding hawkishness (Appendix B.2) and rapprochement (Appendix B.3). The results of these alternate tests are broadly in line with the theory, but each of coefficients are not always statistically distinguishable from the democratic hawk-autocratic dove base category. Though not the primary focus of the main manuscript, an implication of the theory

is that autocratic dove-autocratic dove pairings should be most predictive of a rapprochement in autocratic-autocratic rivalries. An empirical examination of autocratic-autocratic rivalries suggests this is the case (see Appendix B.6).

Overall, I take this high-level examination of post-1945 rivalries as generally consistent with the theory advanced above. The results presented above and in the appendix offer strong support for Predictions 1-3. However the mechanisms theorized to produce these relationships are difficult to test using observational quantitative data. For that reason, I next turn to case evidence.

Case Analysis

Below, I present case studies of rivalry and rapprochement between (1) the U.S. and Soviet Union and between (2) Egypt and Israel. These rivalries serve as pathway cases,⁷¹ elucidating the domestic accountability and international engagement mechanisms described above.

The U.S.-Soviet and Egypt-Israel cases also offer specific advantages. Both are widely studied examples of rapprochement or peacemaking between rivals, allowing a test of the theoretical mechanisms in cases that are seen as historically important and central to scholarship on international cooperation. The U.S.-Soviet rivalry is a hard test of the proposition that limited accountability reduces the salience of hawks' credibility advantage, freeing doves to pursue cooperation and rendering them attractive negotiating partners. This is because Soviet leaders after Stalin were non-personalist civilian dictators, a relatively constrained type of autocrat. The Egypt-Israel rivalry is hard case for a different reason. In the quantitative analysis above, Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin are both coded as hawks, and as such might be a case that would support the main alternative theory: that hawks are more likely to make peace in all political regimes. However, as the case shows, Sadat was a dove, and Sadat's enthusiasm for diplomacy rather than his credibility at home was the Egyptian president's primary contribution to the peace process. That a closer look

⁷¹John Gerring, "Is There a (Viable) Crucial-Case Method?" *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 3 (2007), pp. 231-253.

at the case shows evidence in support of the theory is reassuring.

US-USSR

Four years after emerging as a leading conservative critic of detente. Ronald Reagan reached the Oval Office with a strident anti-Communist foreign policy agenda.⁷² Early in his term, Reagan made good on his reputation as a hawk, pursuing intensified competition with the Soviets in defense production and in the “Third World,” all the while using rhetoric aimed at delegitimizing Moscow’s authority and prestige.⁷³ Though Reagan had a latent interest in engaging the Soviet leadership diplomatically, efforts on this front were fitful through the first term of his presidency.⁷⁴

The turning point was the arrival of a dove at the top of the Kremlin power structure. After decades of leaders with military and revolutionary backgrounds, Mikhail Gorbachev was a different kind of general secretary. The brutal Soviet experience in World War II contributed to Gorbachev’s strong aversion to the military conflict and competition that had defined the Cold War. The young new leader was a striking contrast with Brezhnev. According to one historian, “Brezhnev had relished his medals and his Orders of Lenin. Gorbachev was not interested in such trophies, nor in guns. He hated them, and he had no use for martial bravado.”⁷⁵ While Brezhnev had dedicated much of his tenure to arms racing with the United States, Gorbachev found that if the Soviet Union got “hung up on ‘a gun there, a gun here,’ then socialism is lost.”⁷⁶

Consistent with the theory presented above, Gorbachev’s dovishness was a catalyst for diplomatic efforts to end the Cold War. “Flexible” and “energetic,” Gorbachev’s worldview departed from Soviet orthodoxy under his predecessors and helped to unstick longstanding obstacles to bet-

⁷²Julian Zelizer, “Detente and Domestic Politics,” *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (2009), pp. 653-670.

⁷³Hal Brands, *What Good is Grand Strategy?* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), pp. 113-114.

⁷⁴For an account of these earlier efforts, see Simon Miles, *Engaging the Evil Empire: Washington, Moscow, and the Beginning of the End of the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020).

⁷⁵James G. Wilson, *The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev’s Adaptability, Reagan’s Engagement, and the End of the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), p. 91.

⁷⁶*Ibid*, 135.

ter bilateral relations.⁷⁷ Gorbachev's New Thinking rejected the inevitability of conflict between capitalist and communists camps, and instead emphasized the

indivisibility of global security, the importance of lowering tensions and reducing the risk of war, the imperative of opening the Soviet Union to outside influences, and the need to take legitimate U.S. and Western concerns into account in pursuing Moscow's own security interests. . . these concepts helped ease the zero-sum, Cold War mentality in Moscow. . . and they therefore played an important role in facilitating the transformations of the late 1980s and after.⁷⁸

Gorbachev's speeches gave urgency to the cause of arms control, and he backed up his public diplomacy with a flexible approach to longstanding pain points in the arms control process, such as inspections of Soviet nuclear sites and how to account for French and British nuclear forces. Perhaps as important, Gorbachev's enthusiasm for arms control led him to seek more frequent contact with Reagan, including their famous non-summit at Reykjavik, where initial disappointment turned out to be a major breakthrough in achieving mutual trust and commitment to arms control.

Gorbachev's dovishness induced investment in diplomacy by Reagan. Dealing with a "special, new type" of general secretary, the president "engaged Gorbachev in a way no American leader had previously engaged a Soviet leader in the history of the Cold War."⁷⁹ Though the Reagan administration did not immediately trust Gorbachev, Reagan nonetheless saw Gorbachev's rise to power as a "possible turning point in the Cold War"; indeed, in their very first meeting in Geneva, Reagan concluded that "Gorbachev was really a 'different breed' of Soviet leader, one who was

⁷⁷Brands, *What Good is Grand Strategy?*, p. 127. For more discussion of Gorbachev's thinking on foreign affairs, see Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). For links between Gorbachev's domestic and foreign policy, see William Taubman, *Gorbachev: His Life and Times* (New York: WW Norton, 2017). Vladislav Zubok contrasts Gorbachev's (often vague) "New Thinking" on foreign policy with the "revolutionary-imperial paradigm" of his predecessor. See, Vladislav Zubok, *A Failed Empire: the Soviet Union from Stalin to Gorbachev* (University of North Carolina Press, 2009).

⁷⁸Brands, *What Good is Grand Strategy?*, p. 127..

⁷⁹Melvyn Leffler, "Ronald Reagan and the Cold War," *Texas National Security Review*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2018), p. 86.

less rigid than his predecessors and might ‘make some practical agreements.’”⁸⁰

Gorbachev engaged in an international charm offensive, proposing the abolishment of nuclear weapons by 2000, taking the position that a nuclear war could not be won, and allowing the dissident Anatoly Shcharansky to emigrate to Israel. After receiving a letter from Gorbachev proposing cooperation on nuclear reductions, Reagan noted in his diary: “We’d be hard put to explain how we could turn it down.” He also wrote that while some in the administration wanted to call Gorbachev’s moves a “publicity stunt,” Reagan “said no. Let’s say we share their overall goals & now want to work out the details. If it is a publicity stunt this will be revealed by them.”⁸¹ Of course, it was not (just) a publicity stunt. Gorbachev truly sought radical levels of cooperation with the United States.

Limited accountability enabled the dovish Gorbachev to play so strongly to type. Whereas a democratic leader would have struggled to pursue such a blatant courtship of rival states, Gorbachev was able to insulate himself from hawkish opponents within the regime. Though non-personalist authoritarian leaders are often seen as relatively constrained—and Gorbachev did ultimately face an attempted coup—it is worth noting just how efficiently he sidelined officials who might impede his vision for reform at home and abroad. Soon after taking on the role of General Secretary, Gorbachev moved to purge old guard, conservative, and more hawkish officials from the top levels of the Soviet system and bring in those whose foreign policy views better aligned with his own. “[D]etermined to get rid of hardliners,” Gorbachev leveraged intel on their “drinking habits and assorted indiscretions” to reshape the the senior ranks of the Soviet government.⁸² Gorbachev re-assigned Andrei “Mr. Nyet” Gromyko from his post as foreign minister and replaced on the politburo his main rival to succeed Konstantin Chernenko. After a German teenager landed a small aircraft on Red Square in 1987, “[Gorbachev] ‘retired’ some 150 senior officers, beginning with his minister of defense, Marshal Sokolov. According to William Odom, Gorbachev’s bloodless ‘purge’ amounted to an elimination of a greater percentage of Soviet military leadership than

⁸⁰Brands, “What Good is Grand Strategy?”, pp. 129-131.

⁸¹Wilson, *The Triumph of Improvisation*, p. 104.

⁸²Wilson, *The Triumph of Improvisation*, p. 96.

Stalin's executions of his generals on the eve of World War II."⁸³ Thus, while Gorbachev's may not have used the gruesome methods of political control common in personalist regimes, it is clear that he had the ability to sideline rivals and weaken accountability in ways unavailable to democratic politicians.

Crucially, Gorbachev's personnel moves impressed U.S. officials and made clear that he would be able to deliver on agreements reached with the West. The senior NSC staffer for Soviet affairs, Jack Matlock, wrote in a memo to National Security Advisor Bud McFarlane that Gorbachev's removal of Gromyko was a "brilliant tactical move which puts [Gorbachev] in direct charge of foreign policy." This message appears to have reached President Reagan, who recorded in his diary the following day that "[w]e're all agreed the new Soviet Foreign Minister [Eduard Schevardnadze] is there to hold the fort for Gorbachev."⁸⁴

While Gorbachev's dovishness proved valuable in an autocratic context, Reagan's hawkishness was key in the United States' democratic system. It is not just that Reagan's hardline reputation enabled him to mobilize support for cooperation with Moscow to a degree that would have been difficult for dovish Democrats to achieve. Perhaps as important—and less commonly highlighted in the literature—is that Reagan's hawkishness had the effect of inducing engagement from Gorbachev, who understood the credibility that Reagan enjoyed at home. As the eminent Cold War historian Melvyn Leffler put it:

Reagan's reputation for ideological purity and toughness... afforded him flexibility that other U.S. politicians did not have. *And his Soviet interlocutors knew it.*... If the president struck a deal, it would stick. Reagan provided the incentive for Gorbachev to forge ahead.⁸⁵

Indeed, former President Richard Nixon emphasized the importance of Reagan's hawkish

⁸³Ibid, p. 134.

⁸⁴Ibid, p. 93.

⁸⁵Leffler, "Ronald Reagan and the Cold War," p. 86.

credentials in a July 1986 meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev, urging the Soviet leader to deal with Reagan rather than hold out in the hopes that the next president would be more dovish. Nixon argued that what was important, from Gorbachev's perspective, was that "Reagan had this ability to get whatever deal he made with the Soviet Union through the Senate... unlike, for example, Jimmy Carter, who had negotiated a proposed treaty on strategic arms that could not win Senate approval."⁸⁶ Gorbachev needed "little persuading" on these points.⁸⁷ In an op-ed following Reagan's death, Gorbachev expressed doubt that he could have the achieved diplomatic accomplishments of the late 1980s with another type of leader, noting that Reagan's "most important" attribute from the Soviet leader's perspective was that he "had the trust of the American people."⁸⁸

Overall, the U.S.-Soviet case demonstrates how regime type conditions the value of hawkishness to international cooperation. In the democratic U.S. system, where leaders are easily held accountable by legislators and voters, the credibility that hawks bring to the domestic level of bargaining is highly salient. It allows leaders to mobilize support for cooperative policies. In turn, confidence in a democratic hawk's ability to 'deliver' induces investment in the diplomatic process by foreign counterparts. By contrast, in an autocratic context such as the USSR, the ability of a leader to deliver domestic consent to a deal is a more minor concern. There are no elections and leaders have considerable latitude to shape the composition of potentially constraining domestic bodies and punish those who stand in the way of their policies. As a result, the value for diplomacy that dovish dictators bring to the international bargaining table is highly salient, creating an incentive for democratic counterparts to seize on the opportunity of their rule to achieve cooperation.

Egypt-Israel Rapprochement

Cairo and Jerusalem's rivalry began in 1948 with the establishment of Israel and the Arab-Israeli war that followed. For most of the early years of the rivalry, Egypt was led by the hawkish

⁸⁶James Mann, *The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan* (New York: Penguin, 2009), p. 37.

⁸⁷Ibid, 37.

⁸⁸Mikhail Gorbachev, "A President Who Listened," June 7, 2004, <https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/07/opinion/a-president-who-listened.html>.

Gamel Abdel Nasser, a military officer who orchestrated the 1952 Egyptian Revolution and shortly thereafter ascended to the presidency via a coup. Nasser proved a difficult partner in peace for Israel, and during his rule, the two states never held direct negotiations. A strong proponent of pan-Arabism and the Palestinian cause, Nasser often appeared to relish conflict and competition with Israel. The hostility was mutual. "For Israelis, Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser personified Arab hatred of Israel."⁸⁹

When Nasser died in 1970, he was replaced by his little-known vice president, Anwar Sadat. Though Sadat had a military background and participated in the 1952 revolution, these facts are perhaps somewhat less indicative of his worldview than in other cases. For example, on the night of the 1952 coup, Sadat was not at the vanguard of revolution but had taken his family to see a film at a Cairo cinema.⁹⁰

An unknown quantity to many, those who interacted with Sadat before and just as he took power understood that Sadat was a different sort of leader than Nasser and held more dovish views on Israel and the West more generally. Based on personal experience escorting Sadat on a visit to the United States in the mid-1960s, one State Department averred upon Nasser's death that Sadat "thinks differently" from Nasser and that the U.S. ought to keep an open mind about him as it related to conflict and cooperation in the Middle East.⁹¹ At Nasser's funeral, before Sadat had consolidated power, Sadat told the U.S. representative that "All I want is peace. . . I am prepared to go to any lengths to achieve it."⁹² Just months into his tenure as president, Sadat invited two State Department officials to his residence and surprised them by presenting a detailed proposal for a diplomatic agreement with Israel that would re-open the Suez Canal. One of the officials recalled that "we had certainly never heard anything like this from Nasser."⁹³ Though initially concerned

⁸⁹Kenneth Stein, *Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, and Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace* (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 1.

⁹⁰William Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press), p. 453).

⁹¹Charles Kennedy, "Foreign Affairs Oral History Project Interview of Michael Sterner," *Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training*, pp. 22.

⁹²Kirk Beattie, *Egypt During the Sadat Years* (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

⁹³Kennedy, "Foreign Affairs Oral History Project Interview of Michael Sterner," p. 22.

about his ability to consolidate power—Sadat would ultimately remove rivals rather quickly—U.S. officials saw Sadat as a “considerable improvement over Nasser” in terms of peace and stability in the region.⁹⁴

Though Sadat famously launched a surprise attack against Israel in 1973, the constant in his foreign policy was vigorous outreach to Israel—often through the U.S.—which began in the early days of his tenure, continued even on the first day of war in 1973, and remained frequent in the postwar period.⁹⁵ Consistent with the behavior expected of a dove, Sadat sought peace at virtually every opportunity. As noted above, Sadat indicated his interest in a peace agreement in discussions with American officials in the immediate aftermath of Nasser’s death. He sought U.S. mediation in high-level contacts with Henry Kissinger prior to the 1973 war, and then was perhaps the most cooperative of the regional leaders in assisting Kissinger’s post-war shuttle diplomacy.⁹⁶ When Jimmy Carter became president in 1977, Sadat urged the new administration to launch a new round of diplomacy that had more ambitious goals than the disengagement agreements orchestrated by Kissinger.⁹⁷

Importantly, Sadat’s high value for peace served as the engine of the Egypt-Israel diplomatic process; he was ambitious and willing to negotiate across the many dimensions of the Egypt-Israel relationship.⁹⁸ Sadat was a valued partner to U.S. mediators because of his willingness to compromise for the sake of progress. Yet, when U.S. mediation struggled, Sadat also took key steps to build bilateral diplomatic channels with Israel. Fearing that the multilateral negotiating forum the Carter administration favored would fail, Sadat in September 1977 sent a trusted aide, Hassan Touhamy, to secretly meet Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan in Morocco.⁹⁹ It was following this meeting that Sadat first seemed to believe that peace with Israel was in reach. Two

⁹⁴Quandt, *Peace Process*, p. 84.

⁹⁵Galia Golan, “Sadat and Begin,” in *Foreign Policy Breakthroughs*, Robert Hutchings and Jeremi Suri, eds. (Oxford University Press, 2015).

⁹⁶Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011); Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011).

⁹⁷Quandt, *Peace Process*, p. 179.

⁹⁸Berenji, “Sadat and the Road to Jerusalem.”

⁹⁹Quandt, *Peace Process*, p. 188.

months later, Sadat rescued a “moribund” peace process from procedural obstacles to a multilateral conference by traveling to Jerusalem and addressing the Israeli Knesset.¹⁰⁰ Though the visit did not produce the immediate breakthrough that Sadat hoped, it put negotiations on a track that ended at Camp David and produced a subsequent peace treaty in 1979.

A key reason that Sadat’s dovishness mattered in the peace process was the effect that it had on Israel’s incentive to negotiate. Sadat’s flexibility—particularly his willingness to pursue a bilateral approach that decentered Palestinian nationhood in the negotiations—earned Israeli attention and made clear that Jerusalem could achieve peace with its primary military rival without making compromises on issues that its leader considered non-negotiable. Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem further burnished his public reputation as a peacemaker and statesman, engendering widespread support in Israel for an agreement.¹⁰¹ Crucially, though Sadat’s public diplomacy and broader willingness to engage Israel proved controversial in the Arab world and within his own government, the Egyptian president was not constrained in pursuing and implementing the peace process. Sadat acted “as his own foreign minister,” and indeed “sometimes embarrassed or overruled his own trusted advisers” to show foreign interlocutors that he was in control.¹⁰² Though Sadat was assassinated by Islamist extremists in 1981, concerns for his safety or fear of being overthrown did not constrain his actions in office,¹⁰³ and the peace agreement with Israel remained in effect despite his death.

Whereas Sadat’s dovishness was a key driver in the peace process on the Egyptian side, for democratic Israel, Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s hawkishness was essential. Called a “superhawk” by the *Time Magazine*, Begin had long been an outsider in Israeli politics, seen by many contemporaries as a terrorist for his activities with the Irgun in Mandatory Palestine.¹⁰⁴ Though Begin’s ideological commitments and litigious negotiating style irritated both Sadat and American

¹⁰⁰Stein, *Heroic Diplomacy*, p. 229.

¹⁰¹Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, *Israel and the Peace Process, 1977-1982* (New York: SUNY Press, 1994), p. 59.

¹⁰²Stein, *Heroic Diplomacy*, p. 6, 13.

¹⁰³Berenji, “Sadat and the Road to Jerusalem,” p. 138.

¹⁰⁴“The Nation: Begin’s American Bandwagon,” September 5, 1977, <https://time.com/archive/6849128/the-nation-begins-american-bandwagon/>; Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims: a History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1998* (New York: Vintage, 2001).

mediators,¹⁰⁵ his credibility domestically proved to be an asset. The Camp David agreements received “massive support” in the Knesset, which one historian called “an overwhelming vote of confidence in his peace policy.”¹⁰⁶ Consistent with the theory presented above, Begin’s domestic credibility induced investment in the bargaining process by Sadat and by the Carter administration, even as they were often exasperated by Begin’s less-than-generous approach to negotiation. Begin’s “hardline credentials” contributed to Sadat’s belief that the Israeli prime minister might be able to persuade Israelis of the wisdom of a land-for-peace agreement.¹⁰⁷ Sadat’s assessment of Begin contrasted with his view of Begin’s predecessor, Yitzakh Rabin, who Sadat saw as unable to “guide the public.”¹⁰⁸

In the final analysis, the Egypt-Israel case echoes the US-USSR example in showing how regime type conditions the relationship between hawkishness and peacemaking. The hawkishness of Menachem Begin proved an asset given the importance of democratic consent to concluding a rapprochement. His contribution to peace was an ability to credibly sell an Israeli domestic audience on the importance of cooperation. By contrast, Sadat’s contribution to the peace process was his dovish determination to end the state of belligerency between Egypt and Israel, which led him to take bold risks for peace. Absent strong accountability mechanisms, the controversy and dissent that these bold gestures produced failed to derail the peace process.

Conclusions

Does leader hawkishness matter for international rivalry and rapprochement? Existing literature suggests that it does, but focuses primarily on democracies. Since nearly all international rivalries include at least one autocracy, broadening the scope of this research to include non-

¹⁰⁵Lawrence Wright, *Thirteen Days in September: The Dramatic Story of the Struggle for Peace* (New York: Vintage, 2015).

¹⁰⁶Bar-Siman-Tov, *Israel and the Peace Process, 1977-1982*, p. 149.

¹⁰⁷Sidney Zion and Uri Dan, “The Untold Story of the Mideast Talks,” *New York Times*, January 21, 1979, <https://www.nytimes.com/1979/01/21/archives/untold-story-of-the-mideast-talks-mideast.html>.

¹⁰⁸Berenji, “Sadat and the Road to Jerusalem,” 138.

democratic political regimes is crucial. This paper does just that by reframing the study of hawkishness and international peace as a tradeoff that is conditioned by regime type. Democratic accountability amplifies the salience of domestic credibility, making democratic hawks likely peacemakers and attractive negotiating partners for rivals who want confidence that a deal will be implemented. In autocracies, the salience of credibility falls. Autocratic doves have greater space to deliver the olive branch and make attractive partners for rival leaders, especially for democratic counterparts seeking to convince voters that a rival can be trusted.

Taking regime type into account sheds light on important historical cases in IR. In emphasizing regime type, it also addresses the disproportionate focus of existing research on hawkishness on the U.S. and other Western countries. Focus on the U.S. experience and that of other liberal democracies can detract attention from other cases and create blindspots for research.¹⁰⁹ This paper shows that broadening the scope of inquiry—in this case to include non-democracies—can help researchers uncover important patterns in world politics.

The theory presented in this paper has important implications for contemporary policy questions. In an era of renewed rivalry between the West and China and the West and Russia—prompting discussion of global divisions between autocracy and democracy—understanding the link between leaders and rivalry and rapprochement is crucial. The idea that it takes a Nixon to go to China is now conventional wisdom in academic and policy circles. This study offers an important qualification. It may be that it will take a relatively hawkish U.S. leader to end these rivalries. But the emergence of dovish leaders in Moscow or Beijing could be just as important.

¹⁰⁹Jeff Colgan, “American Perspectives and Blind Spots in World Politics,” *Journal of Global Security Studies*, pp. 300-309.

Appendix

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A Additional Empirical Information

This section of the appendix provides additional information on the quantitative empirical portion of the manuscript, including descriptive statistics, supporting tables, and robustness tests.

A.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table A.1 presents descriptive statistics for the case universe in general.

Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics, Case Universe

N Rivalries	130
N Countries	100
N Leaders	583
Percent Hawks in Democracies	54.6%
Percent Hawks in Autocracies	49.6%
Percent Hawks in Autocracies (Exp. Coding)	72.2%
Percent Rivalries Ending in Rapprochement	66.1%
Mean tenure at rapprochement	8.0 years
Median tenure at rapprochement	5.0 years
Percent Returning to Rivalry after Rapprochement	1.5%

Table A.2 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the regression analysis.

Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics, Predictors

Variable	Min.	Median	Mean	Max
Hawk	0	1	0.51	1
Hawk (Expansive)	0	1	0.65	1
Democracy	0	0	0.49	1
Post Cold War	0	0	0.18	1
CINC Ratio	0.002	1.153	9.321	477.3
MID Ongoing	0	0	0.35	1
Emergence of Shared Rival	0	0	0.021	1

A.2 Supporting Tables

Supporting Table for Figure 1

Table A.3 and Table A.4 presents the results from Figure 1 in tabular form.

Table A.3: Leader Type and Rapprochement, Mixed Regime Rivalries

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Aut. Hawk	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)		
Dem. Hawk			0.07** (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)
CINC Ratio		-0.00 (0.00)		-0.00 (0.00)
MID Last 5		0.02 (0.02)		-0.01 (0.03)
Post Cold War		0.06** (0.03)		0.04 (0.04)
Emergence of Shared Rival		0.06 (0.08)		0.06 (0.07)
Intercept	0.11*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03 (0.03)
Num. obs.	530	481	360	332
N Clusters	84	79	51	49

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ Note: OLS w/ robust SEs clustered at the rivalry level.

Table A.4: Leader Type and Rapprochement, All Rivalry Types

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Aut. Hawk	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)		
Dem. Hawk			0.08*** (0.03)	0.08** (0.03)
CINC Ratio		0.00 (0.00)		-0.00 (0.00)
MID Last 5		0.00 (0.02)		-0.01 (0.04)
Post Cold War		0.07*** (0.02)		0.05 (0.04)
Emergence of Shared Rival		-0.02 (0.04)		0.06 (0.07)
Intercept	0.12*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.03** (0.01)	0.04 (0.03)
Num. obs.	1014	887	379	351
N Clusters	130	122	51	49

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ Note: OLS w/ robust SEs clustered at the rivalry level.

Supporting Tables for Figure 2

Table A.5 presents in tabular form the estimates and confidence intervals from Figure 2.

Table A.5: Supporting Table for Figure 2, Leader-Pair Group Means

	Pair	Estimate	SE	CI Low	CI High
1	Dem. Dove-Aut. Hawk	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.05
2	Dem. Dove-Aut. Dove	0.06	0.03	0.00	0.12
3	Dem. Hawk-Aut. Hawk	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.12
4	Dem. Hawk-Aut. Dove	0.16	0.04	0.08	0.24

The p-values in Figure 2 come from the regression models presented in Table A.6, where rapprochement is regressed on a categorical variable of leader-pair types, with the democratic hawk-autocratic dove pairing the omitted base category.

Table A.6: Leader Pairings and Rapprochement

	(1)	(2)
Intercept	0.16*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.05)
Dem. Dove-Aut. Dove	-0.10* (0.06)	-0.09 (0.06)
Dem. Dove-Aut. Hawk	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.04)
Dem. Hawk-Aut. Hawk	-0.09* (0.05)	-0.09* (0.05)
CINC Ratio		-0.00 (0.00)
MID Ongoing		-0.01 (0.03)
Post Cold War		0.04 (0.04)
Shared Rival Emergence		0.07 (0.07)
Num. obs.	360	332
N Clusters	51	49

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ Note: OLS w/ robust SEs clustered at the rivalry level.

A.3 List of Rivalries

Table A.7 lists the rivalries included in the dataset, along with their start and end dates. The table notes a handful of cases in which the end of a rivalry is not coded as a rapprochement because it occurred as a direct result of military defeat of one rival by another, or because of rival-supported regime change.

Table A.7: List of Rivalries

	Rivalry	Start	End
1	United States-Cuba	1959	-
2	United States-Nicaragua	1979-1981	1988-1991
3	United States-Yugoslavia/Serbia	1992	2001
4	United States-USSR/Russia	1947	1989-1992
5	United States-Libya	1973	2004-2006
6	United States-Iran	1979	-
7	United States-Iraq	1987	2003 [†]
8	United States-Egypt	1955	1973-1978
9	United States-Syria	1970	-
10	United States-Afghanistan	1998	2001 [†]
11	United States-China	1949	1972
12	United States-North Korea	1950	-
13	United States-Vietnam	1961	1973-1975
14	Canada-Yugoslavia/Serbia	1992	2001
15	Haiti-Dominican Republic	1986	1994-1996
16	Belize-Guatemala	1993	-
17	Guatemala-United Kingdom	1972	1981
18	Honduras-El Salvador	1968-69	1998
19	Honduras-Nicaragua	1957	2001
20	Nicaragua-Costa Rica I	1948	1957
20	Nicaragua-Costa Rica II	1977	1998
21	Colombia-Venezuela	1982	-
22	Venezuela-Guyana	1966	2004
23	Chile-Argentina	1952	1984
24	Argentina-United Kingdom	1976	1989-1991
25	United Kingdom-Yugoslavia/Serbia	1992	2000
26	United Kingdom-USSR/Russia	1946	1989-1992
27	United Kingdom-Iraq	1958	2003 [†]
28	United Kingdom-Yemen Arab Republic	1949	1967
29	United Kingdom-China	1950	1968-1972
30	United Kingdom-Taiwan	1949	1955 [*]
31	United Kingdom-Indonesia	1951	1966 [†]
32	Netherlands-Indonesia	1951	1963
33	France-Yugoslavia/Serbia	1992	2000
34	France-USSR/Russia	1948	1961-1967
35	France-Tunisia	1956	1961-1963
36	France-Libya	1978	1992-2002
37	France-Iran	1985	1988
38	France-Iraq	1990	1999
39	France-China	1949	1954-1964
40	Spain-Morocco	1956	1979-1984
41	Portugal-Senegal	1960	1974
42	Portugal-Guinea	1962	1974

43	Portugal-Zambia	1966	1975
44	Portugal-India	1954	1961 [†]
45	German Federal Republic-German Democratic Republic	1949	1972
46	Albania-Yugoslavia/Serbia	1992	2001
47	Croatia-Yugoslavia/Serbia	1992	2001-2004
48	Croatia-Bosnia and Herzegovina	1992	1996-1998
49	Yugoslavia/Serbia-Bosnia and Herzegovina	1992	2000
50	Greece-Turkey	1958	-
51	Cyprus-Turkey	1974	2004
52	USSR/Russia-Georgia	1991	-
53	USSR/Russia-Israel	1956	1979
54	USSR/Russia-Afghanistan	1993	2001
55	USSR/Russia-South Korea	1959	1985-1990
56	Armenia-Azerbaijan	1991	-
57	Mali-Burkina Faso	1974	1987
58	Mauritania-Morocco	1980	1987
59	Liberia-Sierra Leone	1991	2003
60	Ghana-Togo	1960	1994
61	Cameroon-Nigeria	1981	2002
62	Chad-Libya	1960	1994
63	Chad-Sudan	1961	-
64	Congo-Democratic Republic of the Congo	1960	1999 [†]
65	Democratic Republic of the Congo-Uganda	1987	-
66	Democratic Republic of the Congo-Angola I	1975	1978
67	Democratic Republic of the Congo-Angola II	1994	-
68	Democratic Republic of the Congo-Zambia	1977	1979
69	Uganda-Kenya	1973	1997-1999
70	Uganda-Tanzania	1971	1979
71	Uganda-Rwanda	1971	-
72	Uganda-Sudan	1968	2001-2003
73	Kenya-Somalia	1963	-
74	Burundi-Rwanda	1962	1973
75	Somalia-Ethiopia	1960	-
76	Ethiopia-Eritrea	1993	-
77	Ethiopia-Sudan	1967	1997-1999
78	Eritrea-Yemen	1993	-
79	Mozambique-Zimbabwe	1975	1981
80	Mozambique-South Africa	1981	1988-1994
81	Zambia-Zimbabwe	1975	1981
82	Zambia-South Africa	1968	1990-1994
83	Zimbabwe-Botswana	1975	1981
84	South Africa-Botswana	1984	1990-1994
85	Morocco-Algeria	1962	-
86	Tunisia-Libya	1976	1987
87	Libya-Sudan	1976	1985-1990
88	Libya-Egypt	1974	1985
89	Sudan-Egypt	1960	-
90	Iran-Turkey	1980	2001
91	Iran-Saudi Arabia	1984	1988-1991
92	Iran-Afghanistan	1978-1979	2001
93	Turkey-Iraq	1958	-
94	Turkey-Syria	1955	1998-2004
95	Iraq-Israel	1948	2004*
96	Iraq-Saudi Arabia	1961	2003-2004

97	Iraq-Kuwait	1961	2003-2004
98	Egypt-Jordan	1946	1963-1967
99	Egypt-Israel	1948	1979-1989
100	Egypt-Saudi Arabia	1962	1967
101	Syria-Lebanon	1963	1969
102	Syria-Jordan	1957	1985-86
103	Syria-Israel	1948	-
104	Lebanon-Israel	1948	-
105	Jordan-Israel	1948	1988
106	Israel-Saudi Arabia	1948	1981
107	Saudi Arabia-Yemen Arab Republic	1960	1980
108	Yemen People's Republic-Oman	1971	1983
109	Afghanistan-Tajikistan	1993	2001
110	Afghanistan-Uzbekistan	1993	2001
111	Afghanistan-Pakistan	1947	-
112	China-Taiwan	1949	-
113	China-South Korea	1949	1994-2000
114	China-India	1950	1987-1991
115	China-Vietnam	1975	-
116	China-Republic of Vietnam	1954	-
117	North Korea-South Korea	1949	-
118	North Korea-Japan	1994	-
119	India-Pakistan	1947	-
120	India-Bangladesh	1976	-
121	India-Sri Lanka	1983-1984	1990
122	India-Nepal	1962	1971
123	Myanmar-Thailand	1953	-
124	Thailand-Cambodia	1953	1998-2003
125	Thailand-Laos	1960	1988-1992
126	Thailand-Vietnam	1961	1989-1991
127	Cambodia-Vietnam	1969	1979 [†]
128	Cambodia-Republic of Vietnam	1956	1970 [†]
129	Laos-Vietnam	1958	1975 [†]
130	Vietnam-Republic of Vietnam	1960	-

Note: Year ranges indicate periods of transition as coded in the Peace Data. The dagger symbol indicates cases where the end of rivalry is not coded as a rapprochement for the purposes of the analysis because the end of rivalry was caused by the military defeat of one rival by another or because of rival-supported regime change. Though Israel was not involved in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, I also do not count it as a rapprochement since there is no evidence of a diplomatic strengthening of relations. The asterisk next to the UK-Taiwan indicates it was not counted as a rapprochement. This is because the supporting information of the Peace Data note that they failed to find evidence of some of the MIDs that led to its coding as a rivalry in the first place, and because there is no evidence of a diplomatic rapprochement.

Appendix B.3 presents results excluding potential edge cases, such as coding a rapprochement between NATO powers and Serbia after Milosevic lost the 2000 election, or between Afghanistan or Iraq and neighbors who were not part of the U.S.-led invading coalition. The results are similar.

A.4 Example Leader Codings

Table A.8 presents example leader codings used in the quantitative analysis presented in the main manuscript.

Table A.8: Example Leader Codings

	Democratic	Autocracritic
Dove	Jimmy Carter (USA) Kim Dae-jung (ROK) Shimon Peres (ISR) Willy Brandt (FRG) Harold Wilson (UKG) Bulient Ecevit (TUR)	Hussein bin Talal (JOR) Quet Masire (BOT) Haile Selassie (ETH) Antonio Salazar (POR) Jiang Zemin (CHN) Muhammad VI (MOR)
Hawk	Winston Churchill (UK) Charles De Gaulle (FRA) Menachem Begin (ISR) Recep Tayyip Erdogan (TUR) Ronald Reagan (USA) Konrad Adenauer (FGR)	Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (PAK) Chiang Kai-shek (ROC) Hafez al-Assad (SYR) Kim Il-Sung (PRK) Gamal Abdel Nasser (EGY) Idi Amin (UGA)

A.5 Right Wing Parties and Hawkish Platforms

In the main manuscript, I described that parties labeled as “conservative,” “Christian democratic,” or “nationalist and radical right” by the Manifestos Project were coded as right-wing, and that leaders from such parties were coded as hawks. This assumption was justified by prior work on hawkishness and rapprochement that uses right wing parties as a proxy for hawkish leaders, and on other empirical work that has connected right wing parties to hawkish international behaviors. As an additional check, Table A.9 presents the correlations between parties labeled right wing according to the coding procedure described in the main manuscript and relevant content analysis from party manifestos. Specifically, I look at the content analysis for a leader’s party, using the manifesto that most immediately precedes the leader taking office.

The row labeled “Peace Platform” is the correlation between right-wing parties and the Manifesto Project variable ‘per106,’ which measures “declarations of belief in peace and peaceful means of solving crises.” This is the variable that is most obviously relevant to rapprochement between rivals. The row labeled “Dovish Platform” is slightly more expansive. It is the sum of three variables relating to the dovishness of a manifesto, including again per106 and also per105 and per107. Per105 captures negative references to military power, while per107 captures positive references to international cooperation. Both the narrower and more expansive measures of platform dovishness correlate negatively with right-wing parties. Put differently, as expected, right-wing parties have more hawkish (less dovish) platforms. Appendix B.2 then uses the Peace Platform and Dovish Platform variables to predict rapprochement among democratic leaders. The results are consistent with the theory.

Table A.9: Correlation of Right-Wing Parties and Dovish Positions

	Correlation	Estimate	p
1	Peace Platform	-0.21	0.00
2	Dovish Platform	-0.27	0.00

B Robustness Checks

This section presents additional empirical tests using alternate measures for the variables used in the main manuscript.

B.1 Alternate Approaches to Coding Accountability

Continuous Measure of Regime Type

The main manuscript used a binary democracy/autocracy coding to capture political accountability. For a continuous rather than binary measure of regime type, Table B.1 re-runs the specifications from Table 3, subbing in V-Dem's electoral democracy index. Higher scores on the V-Dem index correspond to greater democracy, so the theory expects a positive interaction between hawkishness and the V-Dem index. This is what we see.

Table B.1: Interaction of Leader Hawkishness and Democracy (V-Dem)

	(1)	(2)
Intercept	0.26*** (0.04)	0.27*** (0.05)
Hawk	-0.12** (0.05)	-0.16** (0.06)
Democracy (V-Dem)	-0.23*** (0.07)	-0.29*** (0.08)
Hawk \times Democracy (V-Dem)	0.24** (0.10)	0.27*** (0.10)
MID Last 5		0.03 (0.03)
Emergence of Shared Rival		-0.05 (0.05)
CINC Ratio		-0.00 (0.00)
Post Cold War		0.05 (0.04)
Num. obs.	962	843
N Clusters	411	350

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ Note: OLS w/ robust SEs clustered at the leader level.

Personalism

As noted in the main manuscript, some influential research in IR focuses on personalism rather than the democracy/autocracy distinction to investigate the role of political accountability in conflict and cooperation outcomes. The main manuscript focuses on the democracy/autocracy distinction as a first cut because this is the first paper to bring regime type into the literature on leader hawkishness and peace. However, Table B.2 re-estimates the models from Table 3 using a measure of personalism instead of a binary democracy/autocracy variable. The measure (`v2xnp_pres`, from the V-Dem project) captures the extent to which authority and control is held by a single leader. It is a useful measure of personalism in this context because it can be applied to all leaders. Higher scores on the measure indicate greater personalism (i.e., less accountability). Therefore, the theory would expect a negative interaction between the personalism score and hawkishness, indicating that the association between hawkishness and rapprochement is smaller among more personalist leaders. This is what we observe.

Table B.2: Interaction of Leader Hawkishness and Personalism

	(1)	(2)
Intercept	0.09*** (0.03)	0.07 (0.05)
Hawk	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
Personalism (V-Dem)	0.17*** (0.06)	0.20*** (0.07)
Hawk \times Personalism (V-Dem)	-0.20** (0.08)	-0.23** (0.09)
MID Last 5		0.02 (0.03)
Emergence of Shared Rival		-0.05 (0.05)
CINC Ratio		-0.00 (0.00)
Post Cold War		0.04 (0.04)
Num. obs.	1027	855
N Clusters	437	360

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ Note: OLS w/ robust SEs clustered at the leader level.

B.2 Alternate Approaches to Coding Hawkishness

Expansive Coding for Hawks

The results in Table 3 in the main manuscript used prior military experience as a proxy for hawkishness among autocratic leaders. Table B.3 re-runs the same models, but codes autocratic leaders as hawks if they have prior military experience or prior rebel experience or came to power irregularly. This has the practical effect of moving a greater share of autocratic leaders into the ‘hawk’ category. The results support Prediction 1, that the relationship between hawkishness and rapprochement should be higher in democracies. Using this more expansive approach, the relationship between hawkish leaders and rapprochement is 20-21 percentage points higher in democracies than autocracies.

Table B.3: Interaction of Leader Hawkishness and Democracy (Expansive Hawk Coding)

	(1)	(2)
Intercept	0.28*** (0.04)	0.31*** (0.05)
Hawk (Exp.)	-0.13*** (0.05)	-0.17*** (0.06)
Democracy (DD)	-0.22*** (0.05)	-0.26*** (0.05)
Hawk (Exp.) × Democracy (DD)	0.21*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.07)
MID Ongoing		0.03 (0.03)
Emergence of Shared Rival		-0.03 (0.05)
CINC Ratio		-0.00 (0.00)
Post Cold War		0.03 (0.04)
Num. obs.	1036	855
N Clusters	442	360

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ Note: OLS w/ robust SEs clustered at the leader level.

Applying the same expansive hawkishness coding, we see in Table B.4 and Table B.5 that, as in the main manuscript and consistent with Prediction 2, leader pairs featuring autocratic hawks are negatively associated with rapprochement while leader pairs featuring democratic hawks are positively associated with rapprochement.

Table B.4: Leader Types and Rapprochement (Expansive Hawk Coding)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	0.11*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03 (0.03)
Aut. Hawk (Exp.)	-0.06** (0.03)	-0.06** (0.03)		
Dem. Hawk (Exp.)			0.07** (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)
CINC Ratio		-0.00 (0.00)		-0.00 (0.00)
MID Last 5		0.02 (0.03)		-0.01 (0.03)
Post Cold War		0.05* (0.03)		0.04 (0.04)
Emergence of Shared Rival		0.06 (0.07)		0.06 (0.07)
Num. obs.	530	481	360	332
N Clusters	84	79	51	49

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ Note: OLS w/ robust SEs clustered at the rivalry level.

Table B.5: Leader Types and Rapprochement (Expansive Hawk Coding)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	0.12*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03 (0.03)
Aut. Hawk (Exp.)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.05* (0.03)		
Dem. Hawk (Exp.)			0.07** (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)
CINC Ratio		0.00 (0.00)		-0.00 (0.00)
MID Ongoing		0.01 (0.02)		-0.01 (0.03)
Post Cold War		0.07*** (0.02)		0.04 (0.04)
Emergence of Shared Rival		-0.02 (0.04)		0.06 (0.07)
Num. obs.	1014	887	360	332
N Clusters	130	122	51	49

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ Note: OLS w/ robust SEs clustered at the rivalry level.

Finally, Table B.6 examines the results for specific leader-pair types (e.g., democratic dove-autocratic dove) using the more expansive definition. As expected, the coefficients for all leader types are negative relative to the omitted democratic hawk-autocratic dove base category, which is predicted to be more auspicious. That said, only the coefficient for democratic dove-autocratic hawk pairs is statistically significant. Thus while the ordering of the coefficients is similar to the main manuscript, confidence in the results is lower.

Table B.6: Leader Pairings and Rapprochement (Expansive Hawk Coding)

	(1)	(2)
Intercept	0.16*** (0.06)	0.17*** (0.06)
Dem. Dove-Aut. Dove	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.09 (0.07)
Dem. Dove-Aut. Hawk	-0.13** (0.06)	-0.12* (0.06)
Dem. Hawk-Aut. Hawk	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)
CINC Ratio		-0.00 (0.00)
MID Ongoing		-0.06** (0.02)
Post Cold War		0.03 (0.03)
Shared Rival Emergence		0.01 (0.06)
Num. obs.	360	360
N Clusters	51	51

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ Note: OLS w/ robust SEs clustered at the rivalry level.

Military Experience

Table B.7 presents model specifications similar to those in Table 3, but uses military experience (according to LEAD) as a proxy for hawkishness for all leaders. Work by Horowitz, Ellis, and Stam suggests that military experience is less predictive of uses of force among democratic leaders, which is why I use party ID in the main manuscript. However, the models below nonetheless show a positive interaction between military and democracy, suggesting again a stronger relationship between hawkishness and rapprochement in democracies than autocracies.

Table B.7: Interaction of Military Service and Democracy

	(1)	(2)
Hawk (Mil. Service)	-0.10** (0.04)	-0.13*** (0.05)
Democracy (DD)	-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.18*** (0.04)
Post Cold War		0.07* (0.04)
Hawk (Mil. Service) × Democracy (DD)	0.09* (0.05)	0.13** (0.06)
MID Ongoing		0.03 (0.03)
Emergence of Shared Rival		-0.06 (0.05)
CINC Ratio		0.00 (0.00)
Intercept	0.23*** (0.03)	0.24*** (0.04)
Num. obs.	1278	1063
N Clusters	581	483

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ Note: OLS w/ robust SEs clustered at the leader level.

Carter and Smith (2020) Measure of Willingness to Use Force

Table B.8 presents the model specifications similar to those in Table 3, but substituting in the ? measure for leader willingness to use force for the measure of hawkishness described in the main manuscript. The Carter and Smith framework uses pre-tenure experiences and other factors in a latent variable framework to produce willingness-to-use-force scores for leaders. The measure is continuous and higher scores correspond to a greater willingness to use force. Specifically, I use Carter and Smith's second model, which they find to perform best. Using these scores as a proxy for hawkishness, the theory would predict a positive interaction between the Carter and Smith scores and democracy. This is what we observe.

Table B.8: Interaction of Leader Hawkishness and Democracy (Using Carter-Smith Hawkishness Measure)

	(1)	(2)
Intercept	0.21*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.03)
Hawk (Carter-Smith)	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.08** (0.03)
Democracy (DD)	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.15*** (0.03)
Hawk (Carter-Smith) \times Democracy (DD)	0.08* (0.04)	0.10** (0.05)
MID Ongoing		0.04 (0.03)
Emergence of Shared Rival		-0.05 (0.05)
CINC Ratio		0.00 (0.00)
Post Cold War		0.08** (0.04)
Num. obs.	1254	1044
N Clusters	570	472

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ Note: OLS w/ robust SEs clustered at the leader level.

Dovish Party Platforms and Rapprochement

Data from the Manifestos Project confirms a negative correlation between right-wing parties and dovish policy positions (see Appendix A.5). As an additional look at democratic leaders, Table B.9 presents results for OLS models that regress rapprochement on the actual platform of the leader's party. As noted above, the 'Peace Platform' predictor corresponds to the 'per104' measure in the Manifestos Project, which captures "declarations of belief in peace and peaceful means of solving crises." This is the variable that is most obviously relevant to rapprochement between rivals. The predictor labeled "Dovish Platform" is slightly more expansive. It is the sum of three variables relating to the dovishness of a manifesto, including again per106 and also per105 and per107. Per105 captures negative references to military power. Per107 captures positive references to international cooperation more generally.

Since the theory holds that hawkish leaders have a peacemaking advantage in democracies, it would predict a negative relationship between the Peace Platform and Dovish Platform variables and rapprochement. This is what we observe. Across each model, the coefficients associated with dovish positions are negatively correlated with rapprochement. In Models (1), (3), and (4) the estimates are statistically significant at conventional levels. The coefficient for Peace Platform in Model (2) is on the borderline of statistical significance ($p = 0.1009$). Taking the statistical relationships presented in Appendix A.5 and Table B.9 together, we see that right-wing parties are less dovish on average, and that more dovish platforms are negatively correlated with rapprochement. This should add confidence to the conclusion that, in democracies, hawkishness (dovishness) is positively (negatively) correlated with rapprochement.

Table B.9: Dovish Platforms and Rapprochement in Democracies

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	0.12*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.04)
Peace Platform	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)		
Dovish Platform			-0.01** (0.00)	-0.01** (0.00)
MID Ongoing		0.02 (0.03)		0.02 (0.04)
Emergence of Shared Rival		-0.02 (0.08)		-0.01 (0.09)
CINC Ratio		-0.00 (0.00)		-0.00 (0.00)
Post Cold War		0.07 (0.06)		0.06 (0.06)
Num. obs.	387	352	387	352
N Clusters	120	109	120	109

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ Note: OLS w/ robust SEs clustered at the leader level.

B.3 Alternate Approaches to Coding Rapprochement

As noted in the main manuscript, the Peace Data sometimes codes multiple year transition periods away from severe rivalry. In the main manuscript, I credited a rapprochement only to the leaders in office the year that the Peace Score improved. An alternative approach is to also credit leaders in office during the transition periods as well. The tables below examine the results with this more generous approach to crediting leaders with a rapprochement.

Table B.10 presents leader-level results, re-running the specifications from Table 3 with this broader rapprochement variable. As in the main manuscript, and as predicted by the theory, we observe a positive interaction between hawkishness and democracy.

Table B.10: Interaction of Leader Hawkishness and Democracy (Broader Rapprochement Coding)

	(1)	(2)
Intercept	0.27*** (0.03)	0.28*** (0.04)
Hawk	-0.12*** (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.05)
Democracy (DD)	-0.12*** (0.04)	-0.16*** (0.05)
Hawk \times Democracy (DD)	0.20*** (0.07)	0.22*** (0.07)
MID Ongoing		0.05 (0.03)
Emergence of Shared Rival		-0.06 (0.06)
CINC Ratio		-0.00 (0.00)
Post Cold War		0.01 (0.05)
Num. obs.	1036	855
N Clusters	442	360

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ Note: OLS w/ robust SEs clustered at the leader level.

Table B.11 and Table B.12 correspond to the model specifications presented in Figure 1 but using the broader approach to crediting rapprochement. The estimates are similar and all but one attains statistical significance (autocratic hawks in mixed-regime rivalries falls just beyond conventional cutoffs ($p = 0.104$)).

Table B.11: Leader Types and Rapprochement (Broader Rapprochement Coding)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	0.17*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.04)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)
Aut. Hawk	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.08* (0.05)		
Dem. Hawk			0.10** (0.05)	0.09* (0.05)
CINC Ratio		-0.00 (0.00)		-0.00 (0.00)
MID Last 5		0.07** (0.03)		0.05 (0.05)
Post Cold War		0.05 (0.06)		0.02 (0.07)
Emergence of Shared Rival		0.10 (0.12)		0.09 (0.12)
Num. obs.	530	481	360	332
N Clusters	84	79	51	49

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ Note: OLS w/ robust SEs clustered at the rivalry level.

Table B.12: Leader Types and Rapprochement (All Rivalry Types, Broader Rapprochement Coding)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	0.18*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)
Aut.Hawk	-0.08*** (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.04)		
Dem. Hawk			0.11** (0.05)	0.09* (0.05)
CINC Ratio		0.00 (0.00)		-0.00 (0.00)
MID Last 5		0.05* (0.03)		0.05 (0.05)
Post Cold War		0.05 (0.04)		0.02 (0.06)
Emergence of Shared Rival		-0.02 (0.07)		0.09 (0.12)
Num. obs.	1013	886	379	351
N Clusters	130	122	51	49

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ Note: OLS w/ robust SEs clustered at the rivalry level.

Finally, Table B.13 examines leader-pair ideal types and rapprochement using the broader definition that credits leaders in office during transition periods away from rivalry. Consistent with the theory, all the coefficients for leader-pair type are negative with respect to the omitted democratic hawk-autocratic dove base category. However, only the estimate for democratic dove-autocratic hawk pairings is statistically significant.

Table B.13: Leader Pairings and Rapprochement (Broader Rapprochement Coding)

	(1)	(2)
Intercept	0.25*** (0.06)	0.21*** (0.07)
Dem. Dove-Aut. Dove	-0.12 (0.09)	-0.10 (0.09)
Dem. Dove-Aut. Hawk	-0.18** (0.07)	-0.18** (0.08)
Dem. Hawk-Aut. Hawk	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.10 (0.09)
CINC Ratio		-0.00 (0.00)
MID Last 5		0.05 (0.05)
Post Cold War		0.02 (0.07)
Shared Rival Emergence		0.11 (0.11)
Num. obs.	360	332
N Clusters	51	49

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ Note: OLS w/ robust SEs clustered at the rivalry level.

Table B.14 presents results excluding potential edge cases, such as coding a rapprochement between NATO powers and Serbia after Milosevic lost the 2000 election, or between Afghanistan or Iraq and neighbors who were not part of the U.S.-led invading coalition. Even omitting these cases, we still observe a strong interaction between democracy and hawkishness, supporting the expectation that hawkishness is more strongly correlated with rapprochement in democracies.

Table B.14: Interaction of Leader Hawkishness and Democracy (Omitting Edge Cases)

	(1)	(2)
Hawk	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.12** (0.05)
Democracy (DD)	-0.16*** (0.03)	-0.21*** (0.04)
Hawk \times Democracy (DD)	0.16*** (0.06)	0.20*** (0.06)
MID Ongoing		0.01 (0.03)
Emergence of Shared Rival		-0.08 (0.05)
CINC Ratio		-0.00 (0.00)
Post Cold War		0.01 (0.04)
Intercept	0.22*** (0.03)	0.26*** (0.04)
Num. obs.	982	808
N Clusters	434	355

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ Note: OLS w/ robust SEs clustered at the leader level.

B.4 Results with Fixed Effects

To account for potential rivalry-specific factors, this appendix presents results including rivalry-level fixed effects. Table B.15 re-runs the models from Table 3 but with directed-rivalry fixed effects. As before, we see a positive interaction between hawkishness and democracy.

Table B.15: Interaction of Leader Hawkishness and Regime Type (Directed Rivalry FEs)

	(1)	(2)
Hawk	-0.08*	-0.14***
	(0.04)	(0.05)
Democracy (DD)	0.15	-0.02
	(0.12)	(0.10)
Hawk \times Democracy (DD)	0.16***	0.23***
	(0.06)	(0.06)
MID Last 5		0.07**
		(0.03)
Emergence of Shared Rival		-0.06
		(0.06)
CINC Ratio		-0.00
		(0.00)
Post Cold War		0.15***
		(0.04)
Directed Rivalry FEs	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	1036	855
N Clusters	442	360

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ Note: OLS w/ robust SEs clustered at the leader level.

Table B.16 and Table ?? correspond to the model specifications presented in Figure 1 in the main manuscript, but include rivalry fixed effects. As before, the presence of a democratic hawk positively correlates with rapprochement, while the presence of an autocratic hawk negatively correlates with rapprochement.

Table B.16: Leader Type & Rapprochement (Mixed Regime Rivalry, w/Rivalry FEs)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Aut. Hawk	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.09*** (0.03)		
Dem. Hawk			0.08** (0.04)	0.08** (0.04)
CINC Ratio		-0.00* (0.00)		-0.00** (0.00)
MID Ongoing		-0.05* (0.03)		-0.05 (0.03)
Post Cold War		0.12*** (0.04)		0.09** (0.04)
Emergence of Shared Rival		-0.00 (0.08)		-0.00 (0.07)
Rivalry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	530	530	360	360
N Clusters	84	84	51	51

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ Note: OLS w/ robust SEs clustered at the rivalry level.

Table B.17: Leader Type and Rapprochement in Autocracies and Democracies (All Rivalry Types, w/Rivalry FEs)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Aut. Hawk	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)		
Dem. Hawk			0.10** (0.04)	0.09** (0.04)
CINC Ratio		-0.00** (0.00)		-0.00** (0.00)
MID Last 5		0.03 (0.02)		-0.01 (0.04)
Post Cold War		0.12*** (0.03)		0.09** (0.04)
Emergence of Shared Rival		-0.03 (0.06)		0.04 (0.08)
Rivalry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	1014	887	379	351
N Clusters	130	122	51	49

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ Note: OLS w/ robust SEs clustered at the rivalry level.

Table B.18 presents results for the leader-pair ideal types, including rivalry fixed effects. As before, the coefficients for all ideal types are negative relative to the democratic hawk-autocratic dove omitted base category, which is expected to be most predictive of rapprochement. However, not all coefficients are statistically significant ($p = 0.12$ for democratic dove-autocratic dove pairs in (1) and (2) and for democratic hawk-autocratic hawk pairs in (1)).

Table B.18: Leader Pairings and Rapprochement

	(1)	(2)
Dem. Dove-Aut. Dove	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.07)
Dem. Dove-Aut. Hawk	-0.15*** (0.05)	-0.17*** (0.05)
Dem. Hawk-Aut. Hawk	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.09* (0.05)
CINC Ratio		-0.00** (0.00)
MID Last 5		-0.01 (0.03)
Post Cold War		0.10** (0.04)
Shared Rival Emergence		0.05 (0.08)
Rivalry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	360	332
N Clusters	51	49

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ Note: OLS w/ robust SEs clustered at the rivalry level.

B.5 Results at Leader-Rivalry-Year and Leader-Pair-Year Level

As noted in the main manuscript, one question might be whether the results reflect differences in tenure-length—and thus opportunity for rapprochement—among different types of leaders. To address this concern, in this appendix I examine the data at the leader-rivalry-year and leader-pair-year levels. In the former case, this means going from a data structure in which there is one observation per leader per rivalry to one in which there is an observation for every year a leader is in office and a rivalry is ongoing. In the latter case, this means going from a data structure in which there is one observation per intersecting pair of rival leaders while the rivalry is ongoing to one in which there is an observation for every year in which a pair of rival leaders intersect in office. Leaders and pairs of leaders are credited with a rapprochement in the year in which it was achieved. Table B.19 results are analogous to those presented in the main manuscript Table 3, but using the leader-rivalry-year. The results are substantively similar and consistent with the theoretical predictions.

Table B.19: Interaction of Leader Hawkishness and Democracy (Leader-Rivalry-Year)

	(1)	(2)
Hawk	−0.02*** (0.00)	−0.01*** (0.00)
Democracy (DD)	−0.01*** (0.01)	−0.02*** (0.01)
Hawk × Democracy (DD)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Post Cold War		0.03*** (0.01)
MID Ongoing		−0.01*** (0.00)
Emergence of Shared Rival		−0.00 (0.01)
CINC Ratio		−0.00 (0.00)
Intercept	0.03*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.00)
Num. obs.	6963	6792
N Clusters	134	133

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ Note: OLS w/ robust SEs clustered at the leader level.

Second, Table B.20 and Table B.21 replicate the results showing that pairs with an autocratic hawk are negatively associated with a rapprochement whereas pairs with a democratic hawk are positively associated, and corresponds to Figure 1.

Table B.20: Leader Type and Rapprochement in Autocracies and Democracies, Leader Pair-Year Format

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Aut. Hawk	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)		
Dem. Hawk			0.02*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)
CINC Ratio		-0.00 (0.00)		-0.00 (0.00)
MID Last 5		-0.01** (0.01)		-0.01 (0.01)
Post Cold War		0.02** (0.01)		0.02* (0.01)
Emergence of Shared Rival		0.00 (0.02)		0.01 (0.02)
Intercept	0.03*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.01* (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)
Num. obs.	1998	1996	1407	1405
N Clusters	83	83	50	50

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ Note: OLS w/ robust SEs clustered at the rivalry level.

Table B.21: Leader Type and Rapprochement in Autocracies and Democracies, Leader Pair-Year Format

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Aut. Hawk	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)		
Dem. Hawk			0.01* (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)
CINC Ratio		0.00 (0.00)		0.00 (0.00)
MID Last 5		-0.01*** (0.00)		-0.01** (0.01)
Post Cold War		0.03*** (0.01)		0.03*** (0.01)
Emergence of Shared Rival		-0.01 (0.01)		-0.01 (0.01)
Intercept	0.03*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)
Num. obs.	4108	4036	3267	3198
N Clusters	129	127	119	117

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ Note: OLS w/ robust SEs clustered at the rivalry level.

Finally, Table B.22 shows results from model specifications that regress rapprochement on the leader-pair ideal types (e.g., democratic dove-autocratic hawk). The democratic hawk-autocratic dove pairing is the omitted base category, and is expected to be most predictive of a rapprochement. That the coefficients for the other three pairings are negative and statistically significant provides evidence for this prediction. These results are intended to be an alternate look at the findings from Figure 2 and Supporting Table A.6.

Table B.22: Leader Pairings and Rapprochement (Leader Pair-Year Format)

	(1)	(2)
Dem. Dove-Aut. Dove	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)
Dem. Dove-Aut. Hawk	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)
Dem. Hawk-Aut. Hawk	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)
CINC Ratio		-0.00 (0.00)
MID Last 5		-0.01 (0.01)
Post Cold War		0.02* (0.01)
Shared Rival Emergence		0.01 (0.02)
Intercept	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Num. obs.	1407	1405
N Clusters	50	50

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ Note: OLS w/ robust SEs clustered at the rivalry level.

B.6 Autocratic-Autocratic Rivalries

As noted in the manuscript, doves should also be the most likely type of autocratic leader to achieve a rapprochement in autocratic-autocratic rivalries. Table B.23 presents results at the leader-rivalry level, restricting attention to autocratic-autocratic rivalries. Consistent with the theory, there is a negative relationship between hawkishness and rapprochement.

Table B.23: Leader Hawkishness in Autocratic-Autocratic Rivalries

	(1)	(2)
Hawk	-0.10*	-0.14**
	(0.05)	(0.05)
MID Ongoing		0.03
		(0.05)
Emergence of Shared Rival		-0.11
		(0.08)
CINC Ratio		-0.00
		(0.00)
Post Cold War		0.01
		(0.09)
Intercept	0.24***	0.26***
	(0.04)	(0.05)
Num. obs.	403	332
N Clusters	236	191

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ Note: OLS w/ robust SEs clustered at the leader level.

Table B.24 examines leader-pair ideal types in the autocratic-autocratic rivalry context. We should expect autocratic dove-autocratic dove pairs to be most predictive of rapprochement. Consistent with this expectation, the coefficients for the other pairs are negative and statistically significant relative to the autocratic dove-autocratic dove omitted base category.

Table B.24: Leader Pairings and Rapprochement in Autocratic-Autocratic Pairs

	(1)	(2)
Aut. Hawk-Aut. Dove	-0.13*** (0.04)	-0.20*** (0.05)
Aut. Hawk-Aut. Hawk	-0.09* (0.05)	-0.16*** (0.06)
CINC Ratio		-0.00 (0.00)
MID Last 5		0.00 (0.04)
Post Cold War		0.05 (0.06)
Shared Rival Emergence		-0.12*** (0.03)
Intercept	0.19*** (0.04)	0.26*** (0.06)
Num. obs.	342	293
N Clusters	74	71

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ Note: OLS w/ robust SEs clustered at the rivalry level.